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DIVIDING THE PLAUSIBLE SHEEP
FROM THE MERITLESS GOATS: THE
FATE OF STOCK DROP LITIGATION
Kathryn J. Kennedy*
The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (“ERISA”) provides federal
oversight over employee benefit plans, specifically employee stock ownership plans
(“ESOPs”) in which participants’ and beneficiaries’ retirement savings are in the form
of employer stock. It imposes stringent fiduciary duties, especially for individuals or
entities that purchase, hold, and sell plan assets, including the duties of prudence,
loyalty, and diversification of plan assets. In encouraging the formation of ESOPs,
Congress exempts them from the fiduciary duty of diversification and the fiduciary duty
of prudence to the extent it requires diversification. As the value of publicly traded
employer stock held within an ESOP can fluctuate with the market, federal courts have
grappled with the question as to whether ESOP fiduciaries can be held liable under
ERISA, regarding its duty of prudence, for investing solely or primarily in employer
stock when the statute and the terms of the ESOP provide that the primary purpose of
the plan is to invest in employer stock. The Third Circuit in 1995 in the case of Moench
v. Robertson afforded the ESOP fiduciary to the “presumption” at the pleading stage,
that it satisfied ERISA’s fiduciary duties absent a showing of extraordinary changed
circumstances that demonstrate investing in employer stock was no longer prudent.
The majority of circuit courts adopted the Moench presumption in stock drop litigation,
where plaintiffs sued the ESOP fiduciary for purchasing or for failing to sell employer
stock that had dropped significantly in value. In 2014, the Supreme Court in the Fifth
Third Bancorp v. Dudenhoeffer decision negated the use of such a presumption. Instead,
it set forth a two‐part pleading requirement to be used in stock drop litigation in order
to withstand a motion to dismiss: (1) in the case of a claim for breach of fiduciary duty
of prudence based on publicly available information, the plaintiffs must allege “special
circumstances” as to why the ESOP fiduciary should not relied on the stock’s market
price as being reliable or (2) if instead the claim was based on non‐public inside
information, the plaintiffs must allege an alternative course of action, consistent with
Professor of Law, University of Illinois Chicago School of Law. Juris Doctorate,
Northwestern University School of Law, 1980. My sincere thanks to my research
assistant Marc Daou for his excellent support in this endeavor.
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securities law, that a prudent ESOP fiduciary should have taken after it concluded that
it would not have done more harm than good to the plan’s fund. In subsequent
litigation, this two‐part pleading standard has proven to be too high a hurdle for the
plaintiffs’ bar. The 2018 case Jander v. Retirement Plans Committee of IBM, however,
provided a ray of hope for the plaintiffs’ bar in surviving a motion of dismiss based on
the fiduciary’s insider information. The plaintiffs survived a motion to dismiss by
alleging in that a prudent fiduciary could not have concluded that an earlier disclosure
of IBM’s “undisclosed troubles” in one of its businesses would do more harm than good,
as the disclosure was inevitable and the decrease in the value of the employer stock
would continue over time. Because most other circuits have rejected the use of this
“inevitable” theory to satisfy the Dudenhoffer standard, the U.S. Supreme Court
granted certiorari in Jander. The Supreme Court, however, declined to comment on the
arguments raised by the defendants and the federal government in its amicus brief as
the Second Circuit had not addressed them. Instead, it simply remanded the case back
to the Second Circuit, which, in turn, affirmed its prior holding. Thus, the Supreme
Court’s “more harm than good” Dudenhoeffer standard continues to be a major hurdle
for plaintiffs in stock drop litigation. This Article traces the history of stock drop
litigation and offers recommendations for ESOP fiduciaries to avoid future litigation.

I.

Introduction

In lawsuits brought under the Employee Retirement Income Se‐
curity Act of 1974 (“ERISA”) alleging breaches of fiduciary duty con‐
cerning the selection of the plan’s investments, most claims relate to the
underperformance of the assets selected by the plan trustee (e.g., as
compared to their peers or certain benchmarks) or to the fees assessed
against the investment funds offered (e.g., share classes).1 When em‐
ployer stock is offered in the menu of investments for a defined contri‐
bution plan, however, an alternate issue arises: the prudence of offering
and/or holding employer stock as a plan investment option. The issue
arises in one of two contexts, both referred to as the “stock drop” cases:
where (1) there is a dramatic drop in value in company stock due to a
single event affecting the company or the market, which the plaintiffs
allege should have been anticipated; or (2) there has been a long, slow
decline in value, in which case, the plaintiffs claim the stock should
have been removed at an earlier time from the plan’s investment
menu.2.
1. See George S. Mellman & Geoffrey T. Sanzenbacher, 401(k) Lawsuits: What
Are the Causes and Consequences?, CTR. FOR RET. RSCH. AT B.C. 1 (May 2018),
https://crr.bc.edu/wp‐content/uploads/2018/04/IB_18‐8.pdf.
2. This Article is limited to companies offering employer stock that is publicly
traded on a recognizable stock exchange. It does not address the pleading necessary
to withstand a breach of fiduciary duty of prudence claim in the context of a private
company ESOP.
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Experience in the ERISA litigation context demonstrates that there
is a surge in litigation during and immediately following economic
downturns. For example, following the 2000–02 stock market down‐
turn, there was considerable litigation against defendant ERISA fiduci‐
aries who invested plan assets in employer stock.3 Similarly, in the af‐
termath of the 2008 financial crisis, Bloomberg BNA reported a greater
share of ERISA lawsuits filed in 2008 and 2009 (which involved mostly
investment fee lawsuits) than in other years between 2006 and 2017.4
Thus, one would not have been surprised to see a surge in stock drop
litigation during 2020 and 2021, in light of the economic turmoil caused
by the spread of the COVID‐19 virus worldwide. This, however, has
not been the case. The United States has not seen corporate events that
typically trigger stock drop litigation.5 Nevertheless, plan fiduciaries
should be proactive in avoiding or at least mitigating future stock drop
litigation.
As plan fiduciaries offering employer stock as a plan investment
option may also be officers, board members, and/or top executives of
the employer, their inside knowledge about the value of the company
stock may also raise insider information concerns.6 This raises federal
3. See, e.g., Leigh Jones, A “Perfect Storm” for Pension Suits?, NAT’L L.J., Dec. 13,
2004, LexisNexis; Brett Nelson, Open Season on 401(k)s, FORBES, Nov. 25, 2002, at 62
(“Lawyers have filed 115 suits against 35 companies claiming employees’ 401(k)
plans got shafted.”); see also Brief for Securities Industry and Financial Markets As‐
sociation in Support of Petitioners at 47, Fifth Third Bancorp v. Dudenhoeffer, 573
U.S. 409 (2014) (No. 12‐751) (noting that there were over 250 cases between 1997 and
June 30, 2013, filed by participants in defined contribution plans which invested in
employer stock).
4. See the table of ERISA Cases on Inappropriate Investments, Excessive Fees,
and/or Self‐Dealing in Retirement Accounts, 2006‐2018 (as of January 26, 2018),
Bloomberg Bureau of National Affairs (BNA) ERISA Litigation Tracker. Rachel Fried,
ERISA Litigation Surging—Focus on Fees, COVINGTON (Jul. 16, 2018), https://
www.insidecompensation.com/2018/07/16/erisa‐litigation‐surging‐focus‐on‐fees/;
see also Mellman & Sanzenbacher, supra note 1.
5. See Aaron M. Cunningham, COVID‐19 has not slowed ERISA legal activity,
PENSIONS & INVESTMENTS (Aug. 18, 2020, 1:58 PM), https://www.pionline.com/in‐
teractive/covid‐19‐has‐not‐slowed‐erisa‐legal‐activity (indicating that a considera‐
ble amount of ERISA litigation during this time involved the level of fees assessed
against investments and services offered under a defined contribution plan).
6. The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (“Exchange Act”), Pub. L. No. 73‐291,
(codified as 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a et seq.), regulates transactions of securities in the sec‐
ondary market, after issue, to ensure financial transparency and to prevent fraud. It
is administered by the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”). Insider trad‐
ing is a violation of Exchange Act § 10(b), which forbids the use of “any manipula‐
tive or deceptive device or contrivance” in securities transactions. A violation of in‐
sider trading occurs when a person buys or sell securities with knowledge of
material nonpublic information in breach of a duty of trust that is owed to the issuer
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securities law issues,7 as well as ERISA issues, in deciding whether to
discontinue offering company stock in the plan or to disclose inside in‐
formation to the public that the stock is undervalued.
After the Supreme Court’s 2014 decision in Fifth Third Bancorp v.
Dudenhoeffer,8 plaintiffs have faced an uphill battle in stock drop litiga‐
tion. The Second Circuit’s 2018 decision in Jander v. Ret. Plans Comm. of
IBM offered stock‐drop plaintiffs a glimmer of hope.9 Under a new the‐
ory—referred to as the “inevitable disclosure” theory—a prudent fidu‐
ciary would be required to make earlier disclosure of the insider infor‐
mation regarding the value of the stock if the disclosure of such
information would have been inevitable.10 In a unanimous decision in
2020, the Supreme Court vacated the order of the Second Circuit and
remanded it to consider the thoughts of the Securities and Exchange
Commission (“SEC”) in its decision as to whether ERISA requires a
plan fiduciary either to refrain from making a planned trade or to dis‐
close inside information possibly in conflict with federal securities
law.11
This Article examines the history and trends in stock drop litiga‐
tion, especially in light of the Supreme Court’s decisions in Dudenhoef‐
fer12 and Jander.13 It will also discuss whether the appointment of an in‐
dependent fiduciary would help insulate the employer from stock‐drop
litigation. It concludes with recommendations as to how ESOP fiduci‐
aries and employers can continue to withstand stock drop litigation in
the aftermath of the Jander14 decision. See Section VII of this Article as
to how lower courts have reacted in light of the Jander decision.
of the securities or to the shareholders of such issuer or to any other person who is
the source of the material nonpublic information. Persons found in violation of in‐
sider trading face civil enforcement action by the SEC, as well as criminal prosecu‐
tion by the Department of Justice (“DOJ”). See O’Neil v. Marriott Corp., 538 F. Supp.
1026 (D. Md. 1982) (involving trustees of the ESOP who had knowledge of insider
information who were sued due to their failure to act on the basis of insider infor‐
mation to the detriment of the plan participants). The view of both DOJ and the SEC
is that public, swift disclosure of all material nonpublic information is required by
the securities law. Particularly, the SEC stated that disclosure of material nonpublic
information only to the ESOP participants would violate Regulation FD of the 1934
Act. See 17 C.F.R. § 243.100 (2021).
7. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u‐1.
8. See Fifth Third Bancorp v. Dudenhoeffer, 573 U.S. 409 (2014).
9. See Jander v. Ret. Plans Comm. of IBM, 910 F.3d 620 (2d Cir. 2018).
10. See id. at 630.
11. See Ret. Plans Comm. of IBM v. Jander, 140 S. Ct. 592, 594–95 (2020).
12. See Dudenhoeffer, 573 U.S. at 412, 430.
13. See Jander, 140 S. Ct. at 594–95.
14. See id.
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II. Language of ERISA and Its Legislative Intent
Congress passed ERISA in 1974,15 resulting in comprehensive
changes for all qualified employee benefits plans. The legislative his‐
tory indicates that ERISA was enacted to protect participants’ rights un‐
der employee benefit plans, and to provide employers with a uniform
set of federal standards regarding conduct, responsibility, and obliga‐
tions under such plans.16 ERISA is both a labor statute (influencing the
payment of compensation), as well as a tax statute which imposes tax
requirements on qualified pension and profit‐sharing retirement plans
as they provide tax shelters for retirement savings.17 For‐profit em‐
ployer are eligible to sponsor pension and profit‐sharing retirement
plans qualified under IRC §401(a), which deliver favorable tax conse‐
quences for employers and employees alike. In contrast, other type of
employers (e.g., governmental employers, church employers, public
schools, and other non‐profits and charitable organizations) are eligible
to sponsor retirement plans such as an IRC §457 plan (an eligible de‐
ferred compensation plan) or an IRC §403(b) plan, which are subject to
less onerous Code requirements than qualified retirement plans.
Retirement plans come in two forms: defined contribution plans
and defined benefit plans. A defined contribution plan is one that pro‐
vides for an individual account for each participant and benefits are to

15. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93‐406, 88
Stat. 829 (codified as amended in various sections of Titles 26 and 29 U.S.C.).
ERISA’s labor provisions were codified in Title 29 of the U.S.C., whereas the related
tax provisions of the Internal Revenue Code were codified in Title 26 of the U.S.C.
All section references in this article are to ERISA section numbers and the Depart‐
ment of Labor (“DOL”) regulations thereunder, unless otherwise indicated.
16. See S. REP. NO. 93‐127, at 35 (1973), as reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4838,
4871 (noting the Senate version of enforcement provisions as intended to “provide
both the Secretary and participants and beneficiaries with broad remedies for re‐
dressing or preventing violations of [ERISA]”); H.R. REP. NO. 93‐533, at 17 (1973), as
reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4639 (describing House version in identical terms, as
quoted by the Supreme Court in Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 512 (1996)). For
a detailed history of the events leading up to the passage of ERISA, see James A.
Wooten, “The Most Glorious Story of Failure in the Business”: The Studebaker‐Packard
Corporation and the Origins of ERISA, 49 BUFF. L. REV. 683 (2001).
17. A retirement plan may be “qualified” under the requirements of 26 U.S.C.
§ 401(a) in order to secure the following preferential tax benefits: the plan participant
is not taxed on his/her vested and secure benefit under the plan until such benefit is
actually distributed; the plan sponsor’s contribution to the plan is deductible at the
time of contributions within certain prescribed limits; and earning on the plan assets
accumulate tax‐free until the earnings are distributed in the form of a benefit. 26
U.S.C. §§ 402(a), 404.
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be based solely on the value of the account.18 In contrast, a defined ben‐
efit plan is any plan that is not a defined contribution plan; it promises
benefits to be paid at a given normal retirement age in an annuity form
of payment.19 A participant’s account balance under a defined contri‐
bution plan may reflect annual employer and employee contributions,
forfeitures,20 and investment earnings and losses during the partici‐
pant’s period of participation. As such, it is not guaranteed to provide
certain benefits upon distribution as the value of the assets will fluctu‐
ate and affect the account balance.21
Retirement plans can also be described in a variety of other forms:
pension plans which are designed to provide retirement income, profit
sharing plans which are designed to provide for savings which can be
used for retirement, and stock bonus plans which are defined contribu‐
tion plans where the benefits are distributable in employer stock.22 Gen‐
erally, stock bonus plans are comparable to profit sharing plans, except
that once it is designated as a stock bonus plan, it becomes subject to
certain tax requirements applicable only to stock bonus plans.23 An em‐
ployee stock ownership plan (“ESOP”) may be a stock bonus plan, or a
stock bonus plan and a money purchase plan.24 An ESOP is a retirement
plan “designed to invest primarily in” employer stock.25 The most
18. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(34); 26 U.S.C. § 414(i).
19. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(35); 26 U.S.C. § 414(j).
20. A retirement plan may impose a vesting schedule on the portion of the em‐
ployee’s benefit that is funded by the employer’s contribution. See 29 U.S.C.
§ 1053(a)(2); and 26 U.S.C. § 411(a)(2). For example, the employee must have at least
five years of service upon termination of employment in order to retain the em‐
ployer provided benefit; termination of employment prior to the five years results
to a total forfeiture of the employer provided benefit. The benefit funded through
employee contributions are always vested and not subject to a forfeiture under the
terms of the plan. See 29 U.S.C. § 1053(a)(1); and 26 U.S.C. § 411(a)(1).
21. Types of Retirement Plans, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, https://www.dol.gov/gen‐
eral/topic/retirement/typesofplans (last visited Nov. 2, 2021).
22. 26 C.F.R. § 1.401‐1(b)(1)(i)–(iii) (2020).
23. 29 U.S.C. § 1107(d)(6)(A); 26 U.S.C. § 4975(e)(7), the ESOP must satisfy the
put option requirement in 26 U.S.C. § 409(h); the distribution requirements of 26
U.S.C. § 409(o); the allocation restrictions of 26 U.S.C. § 409(n), if applicable; and the
voting rights requirements of 26 U.S.C. § 409(e). According to the Plan Sponsor
Council of America’s 63rd Annual Survey of Profit Sharing and 401(k) Plans, 15% of
plans permit employer stock as an investment option for both participant and com‐
pany contributions, in contrast to 4% of plans that limit access to employer contri‐
butions only. On average, 22% of total plan assets are invested in employer stock.
See 63rd Annual Survey Report, PLAN SPONSOR COUNCIL OF AM. (2020), https://
www.psca.org/research/401k/63rdAR.
24. 26 U.S.C. § 4975(e)(7).
25. Id. § 4975(e)(7)(A).
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common type of defined contribution plan is the 401(k) plan,26 in which
employer stock may be offered as one of the investment options. Many
401(k) plans designate that the employer stock fund is maintained by
the plan as an ESOP.27 The main difference between a 401(k) ESOP and
a non‐401(k) ESOP is that the latter is invested exclusively in employer
stock (plus a minimal amount of cash for liquidity purposes).28 These
types of plans qualify as eligible individual account plans, which are
exempt from ERISA’s duty of diversification, as discussed below.
Critics of ESOPs focus on their riskiness.29 ESOPs allow employ‐
ees to concentrate their retirement contributions in one asset—the em‐
ployer’s stock—and thus, employees must entirely rely on the em‐
ployer for both their salaries and retirement benefits.30 Proponents of
ESOPs, however, argue: that ESOP employers are more likely to have a
secondary retirement plan (e.g., a 401(k) plan); ESOP employers con‐
tribute fifty‐ to one‐hundred‐ percent more to ESOPs than non‐ESOP
employers; most of the ESOP contributions are from the employer and
not the employee; coverage under an ESOP is more expansive, espe‐
cially for younger and lower income employees; and the ESOPs tend to
have higher rates of return than 401(k) plans.31
While the primary goal of an ESOP is to provide employees with
an ownership interest in their employer, ESOPs additionally serve sev‐
eral corporate objectives. ESOPs can be used in corporate financing to
result in greater cash flow.32 The ESOP may borrow money and engage
in transactions with related parties to purchase employer stock that oth‐
erwise would have been void under the prohibited transaction provi‐
sions of ERISA and the Internal Revenue Code (“IRC”).33 A leveraged
26. Kate Ashford & Benjamin Curry, What Is A Defined Contribution Plan?,
FORBES ADVISOR (Feb. 22, 2021, 9:56 PM), https://www.forbes.com/advisor/retire‐
ment/defined‐contribution‐plan/.
27. Brief for Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association in Support
of Petitioners at 8, Fifth Third Bancorp v. Dudenhoeffer, 573 U.S. 409 (2014) (No. 12‐
751).
28. The ESOP Ass’n, ESOPs vs. 401(k)s, ESOP, https://esopassociation.org/arti‐
cles/esops‐vs‐401k (last visited Oct. 18, 2021).
29. See Corey Rosen, Do ESOPs Need Reform? A Look at What the Data Tell Us,
147 TAX NOTES 1465, 1466 (2015).
30. See id.
31. See id. at 1466–67.
32. Id. at 1468.
33. Under 29 U.S.C. § 1106(a)(1)(A), a plan fiduciary is prohibited from engag‐
ing in a transaction, directly or indirectly, that involves the sale of property (includ‐
ing employer securities) between the plan and a party in interest (which includes
the employer). Similar rules appear in 26 U.S.C. § 4975(c)(1)(A).
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ESOP is a technique of corporate finance whereby the employee stock
ownership trust purchases stock from the employer using the proceeds
of a loan made by a financial institution.34 The employer guarantees the
loan and its contributions to the trust are used as proceeds to retire the
loan.35 This thereby results in equity ownership in the hands of the cov‐
ered plan participants.36 It also allows the corporation to repay the loan
with tax deductible contributions within the limits of IRC § 404(a)(9).37
Privately held companies can avoid the cost of a public stock offering
and nevertheless get shares of the company in the hands of its employ‐
ees via an ESOP.38 The shares can be purchased from the company, ex‐
isting shareholders, or both.39
Title I of ERISA created a federal cause of action for a variety of
claims, including a breach of fiduciary duty.40 On its face, the statute
creates a cause of action for the Secretary of Labor, or a participant, ben‐
eficiary, or fiduciary for liability for breach of fiduciary duty.41 This
makes the faulting fiduciary personally liable to make good to the plan
such losses due to the breach and/or to restore to the plan any profits
the fiduciary made through the use of plan assets, as well as other eq‐
uitable or remedial relief that the court deems appropriate.42
There are several ways in which a plan fiduciary can breach
his/her fiduciary duty. The term “fiduciaries duties” under ERISA and
the IRC is actually a misnomer, as the duties that a plan fiduciary
should perform are prescribed by the plan and/or trust documents or
by law.43 In reality, ERISA’s and the IRC’s “fiduciaries duties” are
standards of care by which a plan fiduciary will be judged in perform‐
ing his/her actual duties under the plan and/or trust or by law.44
34. Adam Hayes, Leveraged Employee Stock Ownership Plan (LESOP),
INVESTOPEDIA (Apr. 1, 2021), https://www.investopedia.com/terms/l/lesop.asp.
35. Id.
36. See Rev. R. 79‐122, 1979‐1 C.B. 204.
37. I.R.C. 404(a)(9) (2014); Tax Advantages for Business Planning, THE ESOP
ASS’N (2018), https://esopoassociation.org/sites/tea‐master/files/2019‐12/esop‐brief‐
3‐final.pdf.
38. How an Employee Stock Ownership Plan (ESOP) Works, NAT’L CTR. FOR EMP.
OWNERSHIP (Aug. 24, 2020), https://www.nceo.org/articles/esop‐employee‐stock‐
ownership‐plan.
39. Id.
40. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1103, 1109 [§ 1109 titled Liability for breach of fiduciary duty].
41. 29 U.S.C. § 1109(a).
42. Id.
43. See Fiduciary Responsibilities, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, https://www.dol.
gov/general/topic/retirement/fiduciaryresp (last visited Nov. 2, 2021).
44. See id.

KENNEDY.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

NUMBER 2

5/23/2022 10:03 AM

THE FATE OF STOCK DROP LITIGATION

401

ERISA and the IRC impose three duties on all fiduciaries of cov‐
ered employee benefit plans:






Exclusive Benefit Rule of ERISA § 404(a)(1)(A): A fiduciary is to
discharge his/her duties with respect to the plan solely in the
interest of the participants and beneficiaries.45 As such, the
plan fiduciary is to act for the exclusive purpose of providing
benefits to participants and their beneficiaries and of defraying
reasonable expenses in administering the plan.46
Prudent Person Rule of ERISA § 404(a)(1)(B): A fiduciary is to
discharge his/her duties with the care, skill, prudence, and dili‐
gence under the circumstances then prevailing that a prudent
person acting in a like capacity and familiar with such matters
would act.47 As ERISA presumes a greater level of expertise for
any plan fiduciary,48 it results in a stricter standard than the
common law “prudent person” standard.49 Under this stricter
standard of care, the Department of Labor’s (“DOL”) regula‐
tions state that a plan fiduciary charged with investing the
plan assets has satisfied such standard if: (1) he/she gives ap‐
propriate consideration to the facts and circumstances that,
given the scope of such investment duties, the fiduciary knows
or should have known are relevant to the particular invest‐
ment or investment course of action involved, including the
role that the investment or investment course of action plays
in that portion of the plan’s investment portfolio with respect
to which he/she has investment duties; and (2) has acted ac‐
cordingly.50
In Accordance with the Terms of the Plan of ERISA § 404(a)(1)(D):
A fiduciary is to discharge his/her duties in accordance with
the documents and instruments governing the plan insofar as
they are consistent with the terms of ERISA and the IRC.51

The Supreme Court views the above fiduciary standards as “strict
standards of trustee conduct. . . derived from the common law of
trusts—most prominently, a standard of loyalty and a standard of
care.”52 As such, courts have viewed such standards as “the highest
known to the law.”53

45. 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(A) (1994 & Supp. V. 1999) (emphasis added).
46. Id.
47. Id. § 1104(a)(1)(B) (emphasis added).
48. See Brief of Law Professors as Amici Curiae in Support of the Respondents
at 4, Retirement Plans Committee of IBM v. Jander, 140 S. Ct. 592 (2020).
49. See id.
50. 29 C.F.R. § 2550.404a‐1(a) to (b)(1)(i)‐(ii) (2021).
51. 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(D); 26 U.S.C. § 4975.
52. Cent. States, Se. & Sw. Areas Pension Fund v. Cent. Transp., Inc., 472 U.S.
559, 570 (1985).
53. Donovan v. Bierwirth, 680 F.2d 263, 272 n.8 (2d Cir. 1982).
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In the context of a fiduciary who is the trustee with respect to the
plan assets, ERISA and the IRC impose two additional fiduciary duties:




Diversification of ERISA § 404(a)(1)(C): A fiduciary is to dis‐
charge his/her investment duties by diversifying the invest‐
ments of the plan so as to minimize the risk of large losses,
unless under the facts and circumstances it is clearly prudent
not to do so.54
Indicia of Ownership ERISA §404(b): A plan trustee may not
maintain the indicia of ownership of plan assets outside the
jurisdiction of the U.S. district courts.55

As ERISA originally envisioned the promulgation of ESOPs, it
modified the above fiduciary standards by stating that the above diver‐
sification requirement and the above prudence requirement (to the ex‐
tent it requires diversification) are not violated due to the acquisition or
holding of employer stock.56 ESOP fiduciaries are charged with maxim‐
izing participants’ benefits by investing “primarily in qualifying em‐
ployer securities,”57 in lieu of investing in assets other than employer
stock. The legislative intent was to encourage the use of ESOPs:
INTENT OF CONGRESS CONCERNING EMPLOYEE STOCK
OWNERSHIP PLANS. The Congress, in a series of laws [including
ERISA] and this Act has made clear its interest in encouraging
[ESOPs] as a bold and innovative method of strengthening the free
private enterprise system which will solve the dual problems of se‐
curing capital funds for necessary capital growth and of bringing
about stock ownership by all corporate employees. The Congress
is deeply concerned that the objectives sought by this series of laws
will be made unattainable by regulations and rulings which treat
[ESOPs] as conventional retirement plans, which reduce the free‐
dom of the employee trusts and employers to take the necessary
steps to implement the plans, and which otherwise block the estab‐
lishment and success of these plans.58

The DOL’s advisory letters are instructional to ESOP fiduciaries,
requiring adherence to procedural prudence (i.e., mandating that ESOP
fiduciaries hire independent financial and legal counsel and that their
decisions consider only the interests of the plan participants and their
beneficiaries).59 Thus, in the context of ESOPs, a paradox has developed

54. 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(C).
55. 29 U.S.C. § 1104(b).
56. 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(2).
57. 29 U.S.C. § 1107(d)(6)(A).
58. Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94‐455 § 803(h), 90 Stat. 1520, 1590.
59. See Informational Letter from the U.S. Dep’t of Labor to Gareth W. Cook
(Sept. 12, 1983) (on file with author); Information Letter from the U.S. Dep’t of Labor
to Charles R. Smith (Nov. 23, 1984) (reprinted in 12 PENS. & BEN. REP. 52);
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for plan fiduciaries: when is it no longer prudent to hold or acquire em‐
ployer stock in the face of the terms of the plan which require the plan
investments be held “primarily in” company stock as permitted by the
terms of ERISA? The statute clearly permitted the plan fiduciary to de‐
viate from ERISA’s diversification requirement,60 but can its prudence
requirement be reconciled with the express terms of the statute permit‐
ting plan investments to be held “primarily in” company stock,61 par‐
ticularly, if the terms of the plan document required the fiduciary to do
so? Balancing the issue of prudence with the stated purpose of an ESOP
to invest primarily in employer securities is further complicated if the
plan fiduciary is a member of the employer’s board of directors, one of
its top executives, or other “corporate insiders.” Those plan fiduciaries
may be privy to company inside information, making it more difficult
to wear “two hats”—one as plan fiduciary and one as corporate officer
or insider. As such, plan fiduciaries who choose to act on their inside
information while fulfilling their fiduciary obligations risk running
afoul of federal securities law.62

III. Typical Breach of Fiduciary Duty of Prudence
As noted earlier, ERISA lawsuits alleging breach of fiduciary duty
of prudence concerning the selection of the plan’s investments have
generally related to the underperformance of the assets selected by the
plan trustee or to the fees assessed against the investment funds of‐
fered.63 Thus, the author felt an understanding of what needs to be al‐
leged in these types of fiduciary duty of prudence claims, in order to
survive a motion to dismiss, would be illustrative. The reader then can
contrast it with the pleading requirements in stock drop litigation, as
now required by Dudenhoeffer.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“FRCP”) 8(a)(2) mandates that a
complaint present “a short and plain statement of the claim showing
that the pleader is entitled to relief.”64 To survive a motion to dismiss
Information Letter from the U.S. Dep’t of Labor to Wilson H. Ellis, Jr. (July 30, 1985)
(reprinted in 12 PENS. & BEN. REP. 1182).
60. See generally, Pamela Perun, Employee Stock Ownership Plans: A Status Report,
URBAN INST. (June 2010), https://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/publication/
62196/309563‐Employee‐Stock‐Ownership‐Plans.PDF.
61. See id. at 1.
62. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 16, 15 U.S.C. § 78p.
63. See Mellman & Sanzenbacher, supra note 1.
64. FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2).
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under FRCP 12(b)(6), “a complaint must contain sufficient factual mat‐
ter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face.’”65 In this regard, courts are allowed to draw reasonable inferences
from the alleged facts to determine that the defendant is responsible for
the misconduct.66 Mere conclusions and a “formulaic recitation of the
elements of a cause of action,” however, will not suffice.67 See Section
VII for a further discussion of the two seminal cases that refine this
pleading standard.
In the context of a claim under ERISA for breach of fiduciary duty
of prudence, the plaintiff “must make a prima facie showing that the
defendant acted as a fiduciary, breached its fiduciary duties, and
thereby caused a loss to the [p]lan.”68 While the fiduciary duty of pru‐
dence requires the fiduciary to discharge his or her duties with respect
to the plan “with the care, skill, prudence, and diligence under the cir‐
cumstances then prevailing that a prudent man acting in a like capacity
and familiar with such matters would use in the conduct of an enter‐
prise of a like character and with like aims,”69 courts focus “on the pro‐
cess by which [the fiduciary] makes its decisions rather than the results
of those decisions.”70 In evaluating whether to grant a motion to dismiss
a claim for breach of the fiduciary duty of prudence, FRCP 8(a)(2) does
not require the plaintiff to plead “specific facts” for the courts to ascer‐
tain how the defendant’s conduct was unlawful.71 Instead, the com‐
plaint may allege facts “indirectly showing unlawful behavior, so long
as the facts pled give the defendant fair notice of what the claim is and
the grounds upon which it rests,”72 and “allows the court to draw the
reasonable inference that the plaintiff is entitled to relief.”73 As ex‐
plained by the Third Circuit, “a claimant does not have to set out in
detail the facts upon which he bases his claim. The pleading standard

65. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)); FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6).
66. Id. at 678.
67. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.
68. Braden v. Wal‐Mart Stores, Inc., 588 F.3d 585, 594 (8th Cir. 2009) (citing Pe‐
gram v. Herdrich, 530 U.S. 211, 225–26 (2000)).
69. 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(B).
70. Braden, 588 F.3d at 595.
71. Id.
72. Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).
73. Id. (citing Ashcroft v. Iqbal 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal quotations
omitted)).
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is not akin to a ‘probability requirement;’ to survive a motion to dis‐
miss, a complaint merely has to state a ‘plausible claim for relief.’”74
In the past two decades, there has been significant litigation in
which 401(k) plan holders have alleged that their plan fiduciaries
breached their fiduciary duty by paying “excessive fees” to financial
advisors and for inadequately disclosing such fees to plan holders.75 As
to the questions about whether the plan fiduciary acted prudently, the
courts have generally sided with the plan fiduciary.76 As defendants in
such fee litigation file pre‐discovery motions to dismiss, the courts have
been reluctant to rule in the defendants’ favor as the plaintiffs had yet
to have a chance to discover facts to prove their claim.77
Braden v. Wal‐Mart Stores is illustrative as to how courts have
viewed whether the plaintiff has alleged a sufficient breach of fiduciary
duty claim to survive a motion to dismiss.78 In Braden, the Eighth Circuit
reversed the district court’s motion to dismiss, which had held that the
plaintiffs failed to state a claim for violation of the fiduciary duties of
prudence as to the investment options included in the plan.79 In Braden,
Braden, a Wal‐Mart plan participant, brought a class action breach of
fiduciary claim against Wal‐Mart and various executives—who served
as plan fiduciaries under Wal‐Mart’s 401(k) plan—on the grounds that
the defendants breached their fiduciary duties of prudence and loyalty
in evaluating the investment options included under the plan.80 The
plan had over $10 billion in assets and offered ten mutual funds, a com‐
mon/collective trust, Wal‐Mart common stock, and a stable value
fund.81 Due to the size of the plan’s assets, the complaint noted that
74. Covington v. Int’l Ass’n Approved Basketball Offs., 710 F.3d 114, 118 (3d
Cir. 2013) (internal citations omitted).
75. See Jon Chambers, ERISA Litigation in Defined Contribution Plans: Back‐
ground, History, Current Status and Risk Management Techniques, SageView Advisory
Group (Mar. 2021), https://static.fmgsuite.com/media/documents/6e6a6ef1‐6f5f‐
445d‐a83b‐d7bd1b15f4f6.pdf. Beginning in 2006, the St. Louis law firm of Schlichter
Bogard & Denton filed eighteen class action lawsuits against many of America’s
largest companies (e.g., Boeing, Caterpillar, Deere, and Bechtel). Such lawsuits gen‐
erally alleged that the plan fiduciaries breached their ERISA fiduciary duties by al‐
lowing recordkeepers to levy excessive fees and to provide imprudent investment
options. One of the most significant of these excessive fee lawsuits was Braden v.
Wal‐Mart Stores, Inc., 588 F.3d 585 (8th Cir. 2009).
76. See, e.g., Divane v. Northwestern Univ., 953 F.3d 980, 983 (7th Cir. 2020).
77. See id.
78. See Braden v. Wal‐Mart Stores, Inc., 588 F.3d 585 (8th Cir. 2009).
79. Id. at 598. This was the first major appellate court ruling in favor of the
plaintiffs in excessive fee litigation cases.
80. Id. at 589–90.
81. Id. at 589.
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retail shares were made available to individual participants, instead of
institutional shares of mutual funds, which would have been signifi‐
cantly cheaper.82 The complaint alleged that the investment options in‐
cluded in the plan by Wal‐Mart’s Retirement Plans Committee (the
plan’s named fiduciary and the entity responsible for the operation, in‐
vestment policy, and plan administration) charged excessive fees,
which were not justified by greater returns on the investments as most
of them underperformed lower‐cost alternatives.83 It also alleged that
the appellees did not alter the plan’s investment options even though
most underperformed the market indices that they were intended to
track.84
The district court dismissed this part of the complaint as it did not
address the process by which the fiduciaries made their decisions.85 The
Eighth Circuit disagreed, holding that it was reasonable to infer from
the plaintiffs’ allegations that the plan offered a limited menu of invest‐
ment options, despite the availability of better funds, which if such al‐
legations were true, would indicate that the process by which they se‐
lected and managed the funds was “tainted by failure of effort,
competence, or loyalty.”86 Hence, the plaintiffs had in fact stated a claim
for breach of fiduciary duty.87 While the appellees could have selected
such funds with higher fees for legitimate reasons (e.g., potential for
greater return, lower financial risk, or more services rendered), FRCP
8(a)(2) does not require the plaintiff to rebut the defendants’ lawful ex‐
planations.88 The Eighth Circuit also noted that “ERISA plaintiffs gen‐
erally lack the inside information necessary to make out their claims in
detail unless and until discovery commences.”89 As such, plaintiffs
need only offer sufficient factual allegations that he or she is not
“merely engaged in a fishing expedition or strike suit;”90 otherwise, the
“remedial scheme of the statute will fail, and the crucial rights secured
by ERISA will suffer.”91

82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.

Id. at 590.
Id.
Id. at 596.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 589.
Id. at 596.
Id. at 598.
Id.
Id. The case eventually settled for $13.5 million in December 2011.
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In contrast, the Seventh Circuit’s decision in Divane v. Northwest‐
ern University is at odds with the opinion of other circuits as to what
must be alleged in an excessive fee case to survive a motion to dismiss.92
The beneficiaries of Northwestern University’s Retirement Plan and
Voluntary Savings Plans (as the university sponsored §403(b) plans)
sued Northwestern University and the plan’s investment committee for
breaching its ERISA fiduciary duty by offering a range of investment
options that were too broad and by offering investment options that
charged excessive fees.93 Plaintiffs also argued that the employer’s use
of multiple recordkeepers hindered their ability to take advantage of
economies of scale, resulting in excessive recordkeeping fees.94 The dis‐
trict court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss and the Seventh
Circuit affirmed.95 Prior to October of 2016, the Retirement Plan offered
242 investment options and the Voluntary Savings Plan offered 187 in‐
vestment options, including mutual funds and insurance company an‐
nuities. By October 2016, it offered a mere forty investment options.96
The Seventh Circuit addressed two distinct claims made by the
plaintiffs in their complaint that the defendants breached their fiduci‐
ary duty of prudence: (1) that the defendants offered retail‐class invest‐
ment funds even though identical institutional class funds with lower
management fees were available to the plan due to its size and (2) that
the defendants failed to monitor investment performance and reduce
the plan’s recordkeeping costs.97 As to the first issue, the court held that,
regardless of whether retail share funds were made available, the plain‐
tiffs had other low‐cost index funds available to them in the plan’s
menu, “eliminating any claim that plan participants were forced to
stomach an unappetizing menu.”98 According to the court, the plaintiffs
could have avoided excessive fees and investment underperformance
by simply choosing from “hundreds of other options within a multi‐
tiered offering system.”99 The court distinguished the facts of this case
92. Hughes v. Northwestern Univ., 953 F.3d 980 (7th Cir. 2020), reh’g en banc
denied, 2020 U.S. App. LEXIS 14992 (May 11, 2020), 2021 U.S. LEXIS 3583 (July 2,
2021), cert. granted sub nom; see also Hecker v. Deere & Co., 556 F.3d 575 (7th Cir.
2009), reh’g denied, 569 F.3d 708 (7th Cir. 2009).
93. Divane v. Northwestern Univ., 953 F.3d 980, 983 (7th Cir. 2020).
94. Id. at 984.
95. Id. at 985, 994.
96. Id. at 984.
97. Id. at 984–85 (these main issues have dominated excessive fee litigation over
the past two decades.).
98. Id. at 991.
99. Id. at 988.
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with the Braden decision where “the investment plan included a ‘rela‐
tively limited menu of funds’—ten—which ‘were chosen to benefit the
trustee at the expense of the participants.’”100 Thus, such allegations
failed to state a breach of fiduciary duty.101
As to the second issue, the court noted that ERISA does not re‐
quire a fiduciary to embrace a certain type of recordkeeping arrange‐
ment and that the plaintiffs failed to show that a flat‐fee recordkeeping
rate would have benefited them.102 Thus, there was no ERISA violation
with Northwestern’s recordkeeping arrangement.103
On July 2, 2021, the Supreme Court granted a petition for writ of
certiorari to review the Seventh Circuit’s decision in Divane v. North‐
western University, 953 F.3d 980 (7th Cir. 2020), cert. granted sub nom.,
Hughes v. Northwestern, No. 19‐1401 (July 2, 2021) (“Hughes”).104
The 401(k) and 403(b) communities will be playing close attention
to the Hughes case as to what needs to be pleaded in a claim for breach
of fiduciary duty in managing a 401(k) plan’s investment fees and in‐
vestment options.105
The author instructs the reader to reread this section after he or
she reads the Supreme Court’s decision in Dudenhoeffer, in which it
frames the new standard of pleadings for stock drop litigation.106 It pro‐
vides a striking contrast as to the plaintiff’s pleading hurdles in a breach
100. Id. at 991 (quoting Braden v. Wal‐Mart Stores, Inc., 588 F.3d 585, 596 (8th
Cir. 2009)).
101. Id.
102. Id. at 990 (citing Loomis v. Exelon Corp., 658 F.3d 667, 672–73 (7th Cir.
2011)).
103. Id. at 991.
104. In October 2020, the Supreme Court requested that the Acting Solicitor
General file a brief in the case. Acting Solicitor General Elizabeth B. Prelogar advised
the Supreme Court to hear the Northwestern case as it implicates a circuit split and
involves important and recurring issues regarding retirement assets in ERISA‐
covered plans. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, Hughes v. Northwest‐
ern Univ., 141 S. Ct. 2882 (2021) (No. 19‐1401), 2021 WL 2144249. The split in the
circuits pits the Seventh Circuit’s decision in Hughes against Braden v. Wal‐Mart
Stores, Inc., 588 F.3d 585 (8th Cir. 2009) and Sweda v. Univ. Pa., 923 F.3d 320 (3d Cir.
2019).
105. The ESOP community is also cautioned to pay attention to the result of the
Supreme Court decision, as the result will have implications for them in non‐stock
drop ESOP litigation involving breaches of fiduciary duty of prudence and loyalty.
See Rick Pearl, Thinking ESOPs: What the Supreme Court’s Decision in a 401(k) Fee Case
Could Mean for ESOPs, FAEGRE DRINKER (July 12, 2021), https://www.faegredrinker.
com/en/insights/publications/2021/7/what‐supreme‐court‐decision‐in‐401k‐fee‐
case‐could‐mean‐for‐esops. As of this Article’s publication, the Supreme Court has
not yet released their decision in Hughes.
106. Fifth Third Bancorp v. Dudenhoeffer, 573 U.S. 409, 428–30 (2014).

KENNEDY.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

NUMBER 2

5/23/2022 10:03 AM

THE FATE OF STOCK DROP LITIGATION

409

of fiduciary duty of prudence claims in stock drop litigation involving
ESOPs, as opposed to a breach of fiduciary duty of prudence claims
involving 401(k) non‐ESOP plans.107

IV. Historical Perspective of Stock Drop Litigation
The Third Circuit’s 1995 holding in Moench v. Robertson was in‐
strumental in shaping stock drop litigation from 1995 through 2014.108
That case involved Statewide Bancorp (“Statewide”), a bank holding
company, and its two wholly owned subsidiaries, The First National
Bank of Toms River (“FNBTR”) and The First National Bank of New
Jersey/Salem County.109 Statewide established and maintained an ESOP
for its employees, which was administered by an ESOP Committee.110
Members of Statewide’s board of directors made up the ESOP Commit‐
tee.111 As it began to experience financial difficulties, the market value
of the Statewide common stock fell from $18.25 to $9.50 from July to
December of 1989.112 During the next year, the price fell even “more
precipitously” to $6 per share in July 1990, to $2.25 per share in Decem‐
ber 1990, and finally, to less than twenty‐five cents per share in May
1991.113 The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (“OCC”) in‐
formed the Statewide board in July 1989 of violations of law and
107. See Schweitzer v. Inv. Comm. of the Phillips 66 Sav. Plan, 960 F.3d 190 (5th
Cir. 2020) and Stegemann v. Gannett Co., 970 F.3d 465 (4th Cir. 2020), which are
referred to by practitioners as “single‐stock” ERISA cases. These cases involved
large employers who spin off a portion of their business to a new company and as a
result of the spin‐off, transfer a portion of its 401(k) plan for the transferred employ‐
ees to the new company. The transferred 401(k) assets include employer stock of the
original employer (referred to as the single‐stock fund), not employer stock of the
current employer. This issue is very common in the “pension de‐risking” context in
which large companies are spinning off assets and liabilities in order to reduce the
large pension obligations posted on their books. If the fiduciaries of the new em‐
ployer’s plan do not divest themselves of the single‐stock fund, they risk litigation
on the grounds that it is not prudent to hold such funds in the wake of their declin‐
ing value, nor did they diversify the investments of the plan so as to minimize the
risk of loss. Both the Fifth and Fourth Circuits held that these single‐stock funds
were not employer securities under the new employer’s plan and thus could subject
the fiduciaries of the new employer’s plan to litigation on the grounds that holding
such funds could be imprudent because of the risk inherent in failing to diversify,
which does not implicate Dudenhoeffer.
108. Moench v. Robertson, 62 F.3d 553 (3d Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1115
(1996).
109. Id. at 557.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 558.
112. Id. at 557.
113. Id.
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regulation across its subsidiary banks and recommended that it im‐
prove policies and procedures.114 A second report in March of 1990 re‐
vealed “lack of depth and quality of management, unsafe and unsound
credit practices, the resulting rapid deterioration in the quality of the
loan portfolio, unreliable regulatory and management reports on loans,
the inadequacy of the Allowance for Loan and Lease Losses, and the
adverse impact of asset quality upon earnings and capital adequacy.”115
By May 1991, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (“FDIC”) took
control of FNBTR, and, a day later, Statewide filed for bankruptcy.116
The terms of the Trust Agreement noted that the ESOP Committee
had responsibility and control over the plan’s administration, including
establishing any investment guidelines, which would be communi‐
cated to the Trustee.117 In turn, the Trustee had exclusive responsibility
over the control and management of plan assets.118 The terms of the
plan provided that the Trustee would invest all contributions in em‐
ployer stock, except for a portion of the contributions that could serve
as a reserve to pay administrative expenses and cash distributions.119
During the relevant time period in which the Statewide stock was
nosediving, it was unclear from the record as to whether the ESOP
Committee met to discuss whether action should be taken.120 In June of
1990, investors filed a class action securities fraud suit against
Statewide and certain of its directors, which was eventually settled for
$3.2 million.121 In early 1991, the Trustee ceased investing in Statewide
stock, and instead, placed all ESOP assets into money market ac‐
counts.122 By November of 1992, Moench, a former Statewide employee
who participated in the ESOP, filed a class action claim against the
members of the ESOP Committee for breach of fiduciary duty under
ERISA Sections 404 and 409.123
In the district court, Moench filed a motion for partial summary
judgment declaring that each of the Committee members were

114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 558.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 559.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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fiduciaries under ERISA.124 The Committee admitted that its members
were fiduciaries, but it filed a cross‐motion to dismiss the complaint on
the grounds it did not breach ERISA’s fiduciary duties.125 The district
court issued an opinion, granting both motions.126 Finding that the
Committee had no discretion under the terms of the plan to invest in
anything but Statewide common stock, the district court held that
Moench failed to establish that the Committee’s actions in purchasing
employer stock was in violation of the plan or ERISA.127 It noted too
that the ESOP plan was a “capital accumulation” plan, one that did not
provide for a guaranteed benefit at retirement.128 Thus, the nature of the
ESOP plan envisions that the value of the employees’ benefits will fluc‐
tuate as the employer stock varies.129 Moench filed an appeal to the
Third Circuit.
The Third Circuit began by noting that it faced a “difficult ques‐
tion”: can ESOP fiduciaries be held liable under ERISA for investing
solely in employer stock when both the statute and the terms of the
ESOP provided that the primary purpose of the plan is to invest in em‐
ployer’s securities?130 Before addressing the breach of fiduciary claims,
the court addressed the Committee’s argument that its members were
not ERISA fiduciaries with respect to investments, but rather, the Trus‐
tee or Statewide was such a fiduciary.131 As the Committee failed to
raise this argument at the district court level, the Third Circuit ad‐
dressed the issue of whether the Committee’s failure constituted a
waiver of the argument.132 The court concluded that the Committee’s
representations to the district court, along with the arguments seen in
its brief, conceded that they were fiduciaries with respect to how to in‐
vest the ESOP assets.133 The Third Circuit then addressed three specific
issues:



124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.

Was the Committee in fact required by the terms of the plan to
invest the plan assets in employer stock?
If the answer was yes, was the Committee limited by the es‐
sence of the ESOP to invest solely in employer stock?
Id. at 560.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 556.
Id. at 561.
Id.
Id. at 562.
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If the plan did require the Committee to invest in employer
stock, did ERISA’s fiduciary duties require it to disregard the
terms of the plan and to diversify the plan assets?134

In resolving the first issue, the court noted that the district court
had deferred to the Committee’s interpretation of the plan due to the
application of the Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch standard of judi‐
cial review.135 In Firestone, the Supreme Court had to determine the ap‐
propriate judicial standard of review in the context of the plan fiduciary
interpreting the terms of the plan in order to deny or grant benefits.136
In Firestone, the employer—as plan administrator—determined that
there was no reduction in the workforce under the terms of the plan,
and thus, it denied severance benefits to a group of workers.137 The Su‐
preme Court invoked trust law and extended a highly deferential re‐
view (i.e., the abuse of discretion or the arbitrary and capricious stand‐
ard of review) of a fiduciary’s interpretation of the plan provided the
terms of the plan had granted discretionary powers to the fiduciary to
so interpret; if the terms of the plan were silent, a de novo standard of
review was to be used.138 As the plan administrator was the employer
of a self‐funded severance benefit plan, there was an apparent conflict
of interest as the plan’s administrator’s interpretation of the plan could
impact whether and how much would be paid as benefits under the
terms of the plan. The Supreme Court simply noted that a conflict of
interest must be weighted as a “factor in determining whether there is
an abuse of discretion.”139
Moench and amici argued that the application of the Firestone
standard of judicial review should be limited to cases involving a fidu‐
ciary’s denial of benefits to a participant (i.e., for claims under ERISA
§ 502(a)(1)(B)), as opposed to a fiduciary’s breach of duty (i.e., for
claims under ERISA § 502(a)(2))140 Hence, they argued that the arbi‐
trary and capricious standard should not apply.141 They pointed to an
134. Id.
135. Id. at 563.
136. Firestone Rubber & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 109 (1989).
137. Id. at 105–06.
138. Id. at 115.
139. Id.
140. Id. In its amicus brief to the Third Circuit, the DOL argued that ERISA’s
fiduciary duties do not mandate that an ESOP fiduciary purchase employer stock
“regardless of the stock’s price or the employer’s financial condition,” and thus
should not extend to ESOP fiduciaries a presumption of prudence. Brief of the Sec‐
retary of Labor as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner, Moench v. Robertson, 62
F.3d 533 (3d Cir. 1995) (No. 94‐5637), 1994 WL 16012393 at *12.
141. Moench v. Robertson, 62 F.3d 553, 565 (3d Cir. 1995).
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earlier Third Circuit opinion, Struble v. New Jersey Brewery Employees’
Welfare Trust Fund,142 which held that the arbitrary and capricious
standard did not apply in the context of a breach of a fiduciary duty. In
Struble, the plaintiffs alleged that the plan’s trustees breached their fi‐
duciary duty by failing to collect employer contributions to the plan
and by applying surpluses to benefit the employer instead of the plan’s
retirees.143 In deciding the appropriate standard of review, the court
noted, that in a denial of benefits context, that the question is whether
the trustees “correctly balanced the interests of present claimants
against the interests of future claimants[,]” not whether the trustees
“sacrificed the interests of the beneficiaries as a class in favor of some
third party’s interests[.]”144 Thus, in the case where the trustees’ actions
are alleged to have failed to act in the interests of the beneficiaries, the
more appropriate standard was the de novo standard of review.145
The Third Circuit in Moench contrasted the facts of Struble, noting
that the former involved a fiduciary’s decision to give a benefit to an
employer rather than a beneficiary (i.e., the fiduciary had to decide
which of two classes to favor), whereas Moench involved the Commit‐
tee’s interpretation of the plan and its investment decisions which did
not favor non‐beneficiaries at the expense of beneficiaries.146 But the
court noted that Moench’s conflict of interest arguments bore on the
second issue raised, i.e., whether the Committee’s members’ positions
as directors made impartial decision‐making impossible when deciding
whether to invest plan assets in employer stock.147 The court also noted
that in contrast in Struble, the Committee’s investment decision was
consistent with the purpose of an ESOP plan.148
In fashioning a judicial standard of review, the Third Circuit re‐
turned to the Firestone decision and used trust law to determine the ap‐
propriate standard of review to apply when the claim is based on vio‐
lations of ERISA’s fiduciary duties.149 But in analyzing the Committee’s
interpretation of the plan, the court applied the Firestone standard, and
since the plan gave the Committee discretion as to interpreting the plan,

142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.

Struble v. N.J. Brewery Emp.’s Welfare Tr. Fund, 732 F.2d 325 (3d Cir. 1984).
Id. at 331.
Id. at 333–34.
Id. at 334.
Moench, 62 F.3d at 563.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 564–65.

KENNEDY.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

414

The Elder Law Journal

5/23/2022 10:03 AM

VOLUME 29

it would apply the arbitrary and capricious standard.150 Hence, it would
“disturb its interpretation” only if its reading of the plan was unreason‐
able.151 But the court rejected the Committee’s interpretation that the
plan document required plan assets to be invested solely in Statewide
stock, when its terms stated that the assets were to be invested “primar‐
ily” in Statewide stock.152 The court quoted Central States, Southeast &
Southwest Areas Health & Welfare Fund v. State Farm Mutual Automobile
Insurance Co.,153 which applied the deferential standard of review when
the trust gave the power of the fiduciary to interpret the document and
the trustee in fact interpreted it.154 As there was no record of the Com‐
mittee’s interpretation of the plan, the court concluded that Moench
should be afforded the Firestone de novo standard of review.155
In applying de novo review of the plan document, the court con‐
cluded that it did not require the Committee to invest solely in
Statewide stock.156 As such, the district court erred in holding that the
Committee had no choice but to invest in company stock.157 The court
then turned to the standard of review to be utilized in reviewing the
fiduciary’s investment decision to hold company stock.158 The court
looked to the language of ERISA, which does not hold an ESOP fiduci‐
ary to the standard of diversification of assets nor to the standard of
prudence of failing to diversity.159 It contrasted that with the legislative
intent to promote employee ownership and to encourage employers to
establish ESOPs.160 The court concluded that its job is to balance these
tensions under an abuse of discretion analysis.161 Thus, it fashioned a
new test: due to the purpose behind ERISA and the very nature of
ESOPs, an ESOP fiduciary who invests the plan assets in employer
stock is entitled to a “presumption” that it acted in accordance with
ERISA and its duty of prudence.162 According to the Moench court:
150. Id. at 566.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 567.
153. Trustees of Cent. States, Se. & Sw. Areas Health & Welfare Fund v. State
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 17 F.3d 1081, 1083 (7th Cir. 1994).
154. Moench v. Robertson, 62 F.3d 553, 567 (3d Cir. 1995).
155. Id.
156. Id. at 568.
157. Id. at 553.
158. Id. at 554.
159. Id. at 564.
160. Id. at 568–69.
161. Id. at 571.
162. Id.
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In attempting to rebut the presumption, the plaintiff may introduce
evidence that “owing to circumstances not known to the settlor and
not anticipated by him [the making of such investment] would de‐
feat or substantially impair the accomplishment of the purposes of
the trust.”163 As in all trust cases, the court, in reviewing the fiduci‐
ary’s actions, must be governed by the intent behind the trust—in
other words, the plaintiff must show that the ERISA fiduciary
could not have reasonably believed that continued adherence to
the ESOP’s direction was in keeping with the settlor’s expectations
of how a prudent trustee would operate.164

Thus, there are a variety of ways to rebut this presumption: the
first is to show facts unknown to the settlor of the trust and not antici‐
pated by him that would defeat or harm the purpose of the trust (e.g.,
facts where an ERISA fiduciary could not have reasonably believed that
adherence to the direction to continue to invest in company stock was
in keeping with the settlor’s belief as to how a prudent trustee would
act).165 The court noted in this case, where the ESOP fiduciaries as di‐
rectors of the corporation “serve[d] two masters,” ERISA’s prudence
standard of care require the fiduciary to make “a careful and impartial
investigation of all investment decisions.”166 Hence, in this case,
Moench’s argument regarding the “precipitous decline” in the value of
the employer stock, as well as the Committee’s inside knowledge of the
company’s “impending collapse,” were evidence that the Committee
should have disregarded the terms of the plan or hired an impartial
outsider to make investment decisions.167 As the record was incom‐
plete, the court remanded the case to the district court to develop such
a record and to apply the principles discussed by the Third Circuit in
its holdings.168 Thus, the Moench presumption affirmed the fiduciaries’
investment in employer stock as prudent unless the plaintiffs could
show extraordinary changed circumstances that would demonstrate
such investments were no longer consistent with the settlor’s intent.
Two months later, the Sixth Circuit adopted the Moench presump‐
tion in Kuper v. Iovenko.169 In Kuper, plaintiffs were former salaried em‐
ployees of the Emery Division of Quantum Chemical Corporation
(“Quantum”), who participated in an ESOP maintained by the
163.
164.
1959)).
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.

Id. at 557.
Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 227 cmt. g (AM. L. INST.
Moench v. Robertson, 62 F.3d 553, 571 (3d Cir. 1995).
Id. at 572 (quoting Martin v. Feilen, 965 F.2d 660, 670–71 (8th Cir. 1992)).
Moench, 62 F.3d at 572.
Id.
Kuper v. Iovenko (Quantum Chem. Corp.), 66 F.3d 1447 (6th Cir. 1995).
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employer.170 In March 1989, Quantum entered into an asset sale agree‐
ment to sell its Emery Division to Henkel Corporation (“Henkel”), ef‐
fective April 17, 1989.171 Under the terms of the agreement, Henkel
agreed to continue to employ existing Emery employees and accept
from Quantum a trust‐to‐trust transfer of plan assets for those employ‐
ees.172 The trust‐to‐trust transfer was not complete until eighteen
months later, while the value of the Quantum stock declined in value
from more than $50 per share to slightly more than $10 per share.173 One
of the issues presented to the court was whether the district court erred
in finding that the defendants did not breach their fiduciary duty by
failing to diversify or liquidate the ESOP funds after the sale of the Em‐
ery Division.174
Citing Moench, the Sixth Circuit held that a plan’s per se prohibi‐
tion against diversification or liquidation of employer stock would the‐
oretically violate the purposes of ERISA as it would conflict with the
fiduciary’s duty to act in the best interest of the plan participants and
beneficiaries.175 As the ESOP in question did not contain a per se prohi‐
bition against diversification or liquidation, the court proceeded to ap‐
ply the Moench presumption and inquired whether the plaintiffs could
show that the fiduciary abused its discretion in continuing to hold em‐
ployer stock.176 While the plaintiffs alleged that the defendants admit‐
ted that they had not considered diversifying or liquidating the ESOP
despite their knowledge of Quantum’s financial problems, that fact
alone did not demonstrate to the court that the fiduciary’s decision was
unreasonable.177 Also the plaintiff’s demonstration that the Quantum
stock continued to decline in value over the eighteen‐month time pe‐
riod was not sufficient to rebut the Moench presumption as its price fluc‐
tuated significantly during this period and several investment advisors
recommending holding the stock.178

170. Id. at 1449.
171. Id. at 1451.
172. Id. at 1457.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 1458–59.
175. Id. at 1457.
176. Id. at 1459–60.
177. Id. (explaining that such fact did not demonstrate a causal link between the
failure to investigate and the harm suffered by the plan).
178. Id. at 1460.
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In the decade following the Third Circuit’s decision, the Second,179
Fifth, Seventh,181 Ninth,182 and Eleventh Circuits183 followed suit and
adopted the Moench presumption. The presumption evolved as a stand‐
ard for adjudicating the plan fiduciary’s liability, requiring a showing
of dire financial circumstances in order to be overcome.184 Courts, how‐
ever, have struggled with determining the stage at which the presump‐
tion should be applied.185 The Third Circuit in Moench had prescribed
the presumption when considering an evidentiary record from the dis‐
trict court on a motion for summary judgment from the defendants.186
The Sixth Circuit in Kuper also adopted the Moench presumption in its
review of the district court’s judgment, which was based on the parties’
trial briefs, proposed findings of facts and conclusions of law, and the
stipulated record of the case.187 Other district courts held differently,
applying the presumption at the motion to dismiss stage, thus, requir‐
ing the plaintiff to plead sufficient facts to overcome the presumption
in order to survive a motion to dismiss.188
180

179. See In re Citigroup ERISA Litig., 662 F.3d 128 (2d Cir. 2011); Taveras v. UBS
AG, 708 F.3d 436 (2d Cir. 2013) (refusing to apply the presumption when the plan
document did not require or strongly suggest investment in employer stock).
180. See Kirschbaum v. Reliant Energy Inc., 526 F.3d 243 (5th Cir. 2008).
181. See Howell v. Motorola, Inc., 633 F.3d 552, 568 (7th Cir. 2011); White v. Mar‐
shall & Ilsley Corp., 714 F.3d 980, 989 (7th Cir. 2013) (requiring plaintiffs to “allege
and ultimately prove that the company faced ‘impending collapse’ or ‘dire circum‐
stances’ that could not have been foreseen by the founder of the plan.”) (internal
citations omitted).
182. See Quan v. Comput. Scis. Corp., 623 F.3d 870, 882 (9th Cir. 2010) (explain‐
ing that to overcome the presumption, “plaintiffs must … make allegations that
clearly implicate the company’s viability as an ongoing concern or show a precipi‐
tous decline in the employer’s stock … combined with evidence that the company
is on the brink of collapse or is undergoing serious mismanagement.”) (internal quo‐
tations and citations omitted); Harris v. Amgen, Inc., 738 F.3d 1026 (9th Cir. 2013),
vacated and remanded, 573 U.S. 942 (2014).
183. See Lanfear v. Home Depot, Inc., 679 F.3d 1267 (11th Cir. 2012).
184. See White, 714 F.3d at 989.
185. See Moench v. Robertson, 62 F.3d 553, 572 (3d Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 516
U.S. 1115 (1996); Kuper v. Iovenko (Quantum Chem. Corp.), 66 F.3d 1447 (6th Cir.
1995); see, e.g., In re Regions Morgan Keegan ERISA Litig., 741 F. Supp. 2d 844, 849
(W.D. Tenn. 2010).
186. Moench, 62 F.3d at 572.
187. See Kuper, 66 F.3d at 1452.
188. See, e.g., In re Regions Morgan Keegan ERISA Litig., 741 F. Supp. 2d at 849
(noting that “[a]t least fourteen district courts in this Circuit have addressed this
issue …” and have “overwhelmingly declined to apply the presumption of pru‐
dence” when considering a motion to dismiss); Dudenhoeffer v. Fifth Third Ban‐
corp, 757 F. Supp. 2d 753, 758–59 (S.D. Ohio 2010). (Normally, under FED. R. CIV. P.
12(b)(6), if the complaint alleges sufficient facts, taken as true, to state a plausible
claim for relief, it will survive a motion to dismiss.)
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V. Fifth Third Bancorp. v. Dudenhoeffer
Although there have been several large settlements in stock drop
litigation,189 the Moench presumption proved hugely successful for de‐
fendants.190 Then, in 2014, the Supreme Court addressed the use of the
Moench presumption in the unanimous decision of Fifth Third Bancorp
v. Dudenhoeffer,191 due to the split in the courts as to whether the pre‐
sumption applied at the pleading stage or only at summary judgment
and beyond.192 In Dudenhoeffer, plaintiffs were participants in an em‐
ployer defined contribution retirement plan in which employee contri‐
butions and matching contributions from the employer were automat‐
ically invested in an ESOP.193 The participants sued the plan fiduciaries
as the employer stock price fell by seventy‐four percent between July
2007 and September 2009.194 The complaint alleged that the employer
stock was overvalued and excessively risky for two reasons: (1) pub‐
licly available information indicated that a large part of the employer’s
business was involved in subprime lending, which could leave “credi‐
tors high and dry” and subprime borrowers became unable to repay
their mortgages, and (2) nonpublic information indicated that the plan
fiduciaries, who were corporate insiders, had deceived the market with
material misstatements regarding the company’s financial prospects.195
Thus, the plaintiffs alleged the plan fiduciaries breached their fiduciary
duties of prudence and loyalty in managing the plan’s investment in
employer securities, despite its precipitous decline in value.196

189. See Emile Hallez, Wawa settles ESOP lawsuit for $21.6 million,
INVESTMENTNEWS (July 10, 2020), https://www.investmentnews.com/wawa‐settles‐
esop‐lawsuit‐21m‐194995.
190. See Kuper, 66 F.3d at 1452; see, e.g., In re Regions Morgan Keegan ERISA Litig.,
741 F. Supp. 2d at 849.
191. Dudenhoeffer, 573 U.S. at 409.
192. Id. at 414–15 (comparing In re Citigroup ERISA Litigation, 662 F.3d 128, 139–
140 (2d Cir. 2011), which applied the presumption at the pleading stage, thus requir‐
ing the plaintiff to establish that the employer was “in a ‘dire situation’ that was
objectively unforeseeable by the settlor,” with Pfeil v. State Street Bank & Trust Co.,
671 F.3d 585, 592–96 (6th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 568 U.S. 1063 (Dec. 3, 2012), which
applied the presumption only at summary judgment and beyond, thus requiring
the plaintiff to establish that a prudent fiduciary acting in similar circumstances
would have made a different investment decision.).
193. Dudenhoeffer, 573 U.S. at 412.
194. Id. at 413–14.
195. Id. at 413.
196. Dudenhoeffer v. Fifth Third Bancorp, 757 F. Supp. 2d 753, 754 (S.D. Ohio
2010).
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Relying on the Moench presumption that the plan fiduciaries’ de‐
cision to remain invested in employer securities was reasonable, the
district court held that this rule was applicable at the pleading stage
and then concluded the allegations were insufficient to overcome it.197
As it was in the Sixth Circuit’s jurisdiction, the district court, relying on
the Kuper case, granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss, as the plain‐
tiffs failed to allege facts which overcame the presumption.198
The Sixth Circuit reversed, affirming the use of the Moench pre‐
sumption, but rejecting its use at the pleading stage.199 As the allega‐
tions in the complaint were sufficient to state a claim for breach of fidu‐
ciary duty,200 the lawsuit should have proceeded, and thus, the court
remanded the case to the district court.201
Before the Supreme Court, the plan fiduciaries alleged the follow‐
ing arguments which were rejected by the court:


As ERISA’s prudence standard is judged in terms of what a
prudent person would do “in the conduct of an enterprise of a
like character and with like aims,” an ESOP fiduciary’s deci‐
sion to buy more share of employer stock may be prudent as it
promotes employee ownership of employer stock, even
though it may be imprudent when viewed solely as an attempt
to secure financial retirement benefits while avoiding exces‐
sive risk.202 The Supreme Court rejected this argument as
ERISA’s duty of prudence should not depend on a specific
nonpecuniary goal set forth in an ERISA plan.203 ERISA’s ex‐
clusive purpose standard requires the plan fiduciary to pro‐
vide financial retirement benefits (while defraying reasonable

197. Id. at 758 (quoting Kuper v. Iovenko, 66 F.3d 1447, 1459 (6th Cir. 1995)).
198. Dudenhoeffer, 757 F. Supp. 2d at 760–61 (citing to the Wright v. Oregon Met‐
allurgical Corp., 360 F.3d 1090, 1095–96 (9th Cir. 2004), where a 72% decline in the
value of the employer stock was insufficient to overcome the presumption of rea‐
sonableness).
199. Dudenhoeffer v. Fifth Third Bancorp, 692 F.3d 410, 418 (6th Cir. 2012) (cit‐
ing to the Pfeil v. State St. Bank & Trust Co., 671 F.3d 585, 592 (6th Cir. 2012), cert.
denied, 568 U.S. 1063 (Dec. 3, 2012), holding that the Kuper presumption “is not an
additional pleading requirement and thus does not apply at the motion to dismiss
stage.”).
200. Dudenhoeffer, 692 F.3d at 419–20.
201. Id. at 423–24.
202. Fifth Third Bancorp v. Dudenhoeffer, 573 U.S. 409, 419–20 (2014). (In its
Brief for the DOL as Amicus Curiae in Support of Appellants, in Dudenhoeffer v. Fifth
Third Bancorp, No. 11‐3012, U.S. Supreme Court (2014), the DOL argued against the
presumption of prudence as ERISA prohibits a fiduciary from knowingly paying an
inflated price for employer stock as it is neither prudent nor in the interest of the
plan participants and beneficiaries to do so. In addition, ERISA’s prudent man
standard is not caveated with reference to “dire financial circumstances” or “immi‐
nent collapse,” which the Sixth Circuit appears to interpret the Kuper presumption).
203. Id. at 420.
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expenses in administering the plan) and does not cover non‐
pecuniary benefits such as ownership in employer stock.204
While ERISA requires the plan fiduciary to act in accordance
with documents and instruments governing the terms of the
plan, the duty of prudence “trumps the instructions of a plan
document” as ERISA’s prudence standard is altered for an
ESOP plan fiduciary “only to the extent that it requires diver‐
sification.”205
The plan fiduciaries argued that ERISA’s duty of prudence
should be construed in light of the common law of trusts rule
that “the settlor can reduce or waive the prudent man stand‐
ard of care by specific language in the trust document.”206 As
such, the plan document may waive the duty of prudence to
the extent it conflicts with investment of employer stock unless
“extraordinary circumstances” exist which would threaten the
goal of owning employer stock.207 The Supreme Court rejected
this argument as that, in contrast to the rule at common law,
“trust documents cannot excuse trustees from their duties un‐
der ERISA.”208
The plan fiduciaries next argued that subjecting ESOP fiduci‐
aries to a duty of prudence without the protection of the
Moench presumption would lead to conflicts with the securi‐
ties laws’ mandate against insider trading.209 While acknowl‐
edging that this concern was a legitimate one, an ESOP‐
specific rule that a plan fiduciary does not act imprudently
when buying or holding employer stock unless the employer
is “on the brink of collapse (or the like)” was not a viable stand‐
ard according to the Court.210 It acknowledged that while
ESOP fiduciaries may be more likely to be insiders as com‐
pared to other ERISA fiduciaries, the potential for conflict with

204. Id.
205. Id. at 420–21.
206. Id. at 422 (citing G. Bogert & G. Bogert, Law of Trusts and Trustees § 541,
p.172 (rev. 2d ed. 1993) and RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 174, cmt. d (AM. L.
INST. 1957)).
207. Id.
208. Id. at 422–23 (citing Cent. States, Se. & Sw. Areas Pension Fund v. Cent.
Transp., 472 U.S. 559, 568 (1985)).
209. Id. (The SEC did not submit an amicus brief in the Dudenhoeffer case. In its
Brief for Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association in Support of Peti‐
tioners, Fifth Third Bancorp v. Dudenhoeffer, No. 12‐751, U.S. Supreme Court (2014),
the trade association known as Securities Industry and Financial Markets Associa‐
tion (SIFMA) pressed the Court for a strong presumption of prudence in allowing
participants in a defined contribution plan to invest in employer stock. SIFMA indi‐
cated that ERISA stock‐drop cases were often joined by securities fraud suits. The
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA), Pub. L. No. 104‐67, 109
Stat. 737, added heightened pleading standards, an automatic stay on discovery,
and a structured lead plaintiff appointment process in an effort to discourage litiga‐
tion. Allowing a plausible ERISA imprudence claim without the use of a presump‐
tion would undermine the hurdles imposed by PSLRA).
210. Id.
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the securities laws exists for a non‐ESOP fiduciary who has in‐
side information about an investment.211
Lastly, the plan fiduciaries argued that without the use of the
Moench presumption the threat of costly lawsuits would deter
employers from offering ESOPs to their employees, contrary
to the intent of Congress.212 As such, ESOP fiduciaries would
be “between a rock and a hard place”: they would be held lia‐
ble either for the employer stock’s poor performance if they
continue to hold the stock or for a missed opportunity to ben‐
efit from its good performance if they decided not to hold the
stock.213 But the Court noted that ERISA requires a “careful
balancing” between enforcing participant’s rights under the
plan and avoiding a system that is so complex that the admin‐
istrative and litigation costs discourage employers from offer‐
ing such plans.214 It then rejected the use of a presumption to
preserve such “balancing,” as it makes it impossible for a
plaintiff to state a duty of prudence claim and it does not “di‐
vide the plausible sheep from the meritless goats.”215 It also
noted another feature for weeding out meritless claims: the
motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim.216 As ERISA’s
duty of prudence is based on “the circumstances. . . prevail‐
ing” at the time the fiduciary acts, it is context specific.217 Thus,
the Sixth Circuit was correct in that the plan participants had
stated a plausible duty‐of‐prudence claim, which should have
been allowed to go forward.218

The plaintiff plan participants in turn made the following argu‐
ments:


The plan fiduciaries should have known in light of publicly
available information (e.g., the decline in the stock’s value as a
result of the collapse of the housing market), that continuing
to hold employer stock was imprudent.219 The Supreme Court
rejected the argument that the plan fiduciaries should have
known from publicly available information alone that the mar‐
ket had over‐ or under‐valued the stock.220 In the words of the

211. Id.
212. Id.
213. Id. at 424.
214. Id. at 424–25 (citing to Conkright v. Frommert, 559 U.S. 506, 517 (2010),
which quoted Aetna Health, Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200, 215 (2004)). See also Varity
Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 497 (1996).
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. Id. at 425–26.
219. Id. at 426.
220. Id. at 426–27 (quoting from Summers v. State Street Bank & Trust Co., 453
F.3d 404, 408 (7th Cir. 2006) that a fiduciary usually “is not imprudent to assume
that a major stock market … provides the best estimate of the value of the stocks
traded on it that is available to him,” and White v. Marshall & Illsley Corp., 714 F.3d
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Court, “where the stock is publicly traded, allegations that a
fiduciary should have recognized from publicly available in‐
formation alone that the market was over‐ or undervaluing the
stock are implausible as a general rule, at least in the absence
of special circumstances.”221 As the facts posed in this case did
not point to “special circumstances” that would reflect the re‐
liability of the market price (e.g., “an unbiased assessment of
security’s value in light of all public information”),222 the fidu‐
ciary could prudently rely on the market price. Unfortunately
for future lower courts, the Court did not define what was
meant by “special circumstances.”
The plan participants next argued that the plan fiduciaries
acted imprudently on the basis of nonpublic information, as
they were Fifth Third insiders, which they should have relied
upon to prevent losses to the plan’s funds by selling off the
employer stock, refraining from making future purchases of
employer stock, or by publicly disclosing the inside infor‐
mation so that the market could correctly adjust the stock
price.223

In response to the plaintiff’s arguments, the Court held that “[t]o
state a claim for breach of the duty of prudence” imposed on plan fidu‐
ciaries by ERISA “on the basis of inside information, a plaintiff must
plausibly allege an alternative action that the defendant could have taken that
would have been consistent with the securities laws and that a prudent
fiduciary in the same circumstances would not have viewed as more
likely to harm the fund than to help it.”224
In justifying this new standard, the Court noted the following
three considerations that are to “inform the requisite analysis.”225 First,
ERISA’s prudence standard does not require a plan fiduciary to violate
federal securities laws in deciding whether to divest the fund’s holding
in employer stock.226 Second, in determining whether the plan fiduciar‐
ies should have refrained from buying additional stock or disclosed in‐
sider information to the market, the courts should consider the extent
to which ERISA’s standards conflict with complex insider trading and
corporate disclosure requirements imposed by federal securities law or
980, 992 (7th Cir. 2013) that a fiduciary’s “fail[ure] to outsmart a presumptively effi‐
cient market … is … not a sound basis for imposing liability”).
221. Id. at 426–27.
222. Id. at 427 (quoting Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund Inc., 573 U.S. 258,
273 (2014), which quoted Amgen Inc. v. Conn. Ret. Plans & Trust Funds, 568 U.S.
455, 462 (2013)).
223. Id. at 427–28.
224. Id. at 428 (emphasis added); Ret. Plans Comm. of IBM v. Jander, 140 S. Ct.
592, 594 (2020).
225. Fifth Third Bancorp v. Dudenhoeffer, 573 U.S. 409, 428–30 (2014).
226. Id. at 428.
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with their objectives.227 To that end, the Court noted that the “U.S. Se‐
curities and Exchange Commission has not advised us of its views on
these matters, and we believe those views may well be relevant.”228
Third, lower courts should also consider whether a prudent fiduciary in
the defendant’s position could not have concluded that by stopping
purchase of employer stock, it would signal to the market that the stock
was a bad investment due to their inside knowledge—or that publicly
disclosing negative information “would do more harm than good” to
the fund due to the drop in the stock price.229
The Court vacated the judgment of the Sixth Circuit and re‐
manded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion.230
The Court required plaintiffs to allege a plausible claim to overcome a
motion to dismiss.231 In this regard, it created two different standards
for plaintiffs to proceed in alleging stock drop cases based on the plan’s
fiduciary action (e.g., holding on to the stock) or inaction (e.g., failing
to remove the stock):




If the claims were based on publicly available information that
the plan fiduciary knew or should have known would render
their decision imprudent to purchase or to refrain from pur‐
chasing employer stock, the plaintiff must allege “special cir‐
cumstances” as to why the market price was unreliable. The
Court subscribed to the efficient market hypothesis, which
means the market adjusts the stock price accordingly based on
all public information that it has about the stock.232 As noted
earlier, the Court did not define what constituted “special cir‐
cumstances” for purposes of this standard.
If the claims were based on nonpublic inside information that
the plan fiduciary knew would render their decision impru‐
dent to purchase or to refrain from purchasing employer stock,
the plaintiffs must (1) allege that the fiduciary had an alterna‐
tive course of action that it could have taken consistent with

227. Id. at 429.
228. Id.
229. Id. at 429–30.
230. Id. at 430. Note the Supreme Court’s decision in Dudenhoeffer involved an
ESOP of a publicly traded company. It is unclear as to whether it applies in stock
drop litigation of an ESOP of a privately held company. See Hill v. Hill Brothers
Construction Co., No. 14CV213, 2016 WL 1252983 (N.D. Miss. Mar. 28, 2016) (apply‐
ing the Dudenhoeffer pleading standing in the context of an ESOP of a privately held
company). But see Allen v. GreatBanc Trust Co., 835 F.3d 670, 679–80 (7th Cir. 2016)
(rejecting the Dudenhoeffer pleading standard in the context of an ESOP of a privately
held company). See Dudenhoeffer Focuses on Public Companies: Attorneys Mull Applica‐
tion to Private ESOPs, 41 BNA Pens. & Bens. Rptr. 1947 (2014) (discussing the impli‐
cations of Dudenhoeffer on ESOPs of privately held companies).
231. Fifth Third Bancorp. v. Dudenhoeffer, 573 U.S. 409, 426–27 (2014).
232. Id. at 426.
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securities laws and (2) demonstrate that a prudent fiduciary in
the same circumstances could not have concluded that such
alternative action would do more harm than good to the plan’s
funds.233

Immediately following the Dudenhoeffer decision, it was not clear
whether the decision would continue to be more favorable for defend‐
ants than for plaintiffs. Stock‐drop litigation in the seven years follow‐
ing Dudenhoeffer, however, has proven that “Dudenhoeffer appears to
have raised the bar for plaintiffs seeking to bring a claim based on a
breach of the duty of prudence.”234 Aside from some notable large set‐
tlements in which employers conceded in order to avoid the cost of lit‐
igation,235 plaintiffs have been unable to succeed on both public infor‐
mation and nonpublic‐information‐based claims.236 Plan fiduciaries,
however, cannot ignore the threat of stock drop litigation due to the
possibility of large settlements.237 The benefits community has also seen
several instances of “reverse” stock drop litigation (e.g., the fiduciary
sold the stock too soon, thereby denying the plaintiffs the benefit of the
appreciation).238 Thus, plan fiduciaries should be watchful of the risks
of both types of litigation—stock drop and “reverse” stock drop.

233. Id. at 428.
234. In re Lehman Brothers, Secs. & ERISA Litig., 113 F. Supp. 3d 745, 755
(S.D.N.Y. 2015).
235. Id.
236. Quan v. Computer Sciences Corp., 623 F.3d 870, 880–81 (9th Cir. 2010)
(adopting the Moench presumption).
237. Id.
238. See Tatum v. RJR Pension Inv. Comm., 855 F.3d 553 (4th Cir. 2017).
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VI. The Aftermath of Dudenhoeffer Until 2018
The following post‐Dudenhoeffer and pre‐Jander federal circuit
cases are illustrative of the difficulties that plaintiffs have had in argu‐
ing stock drop litigation. This section begins with a case from the Ninth
Circuit as the Supreme Court commented on the case for a second time
post‐Dudenhoeffer.
A.

Ninth Circuit analysis

In Amgen Inc. v. Harris, the Supreme Court considered for a sec‐
ond time a complaint initially filed pre‐Dudenhoeffer by the participants
of a defined contribution plan, sponsored by Amgen Inc. and its sub‐
sidiary, that offer employer stock as an investment option.239 This case
from the Ninth Circuit has a torturous past. The participants sued the
plan’s fiduciaries on the grounds that they breached their fiduciary du‐
ties by allowing the plan to purchase and hold employer stock in light
of the decline in the value of the employer stock.240 The complaint al‐
leged that the plan fiduciaries breached their ERISA fiduciary duty of
prudence by remaining invested in company stock notwithstanding
their inside knowledge over safety concerns related to one of its most
popular drugs.241 When those safety concerns became public, the com‐
pany stock price dropped in value, negatively impacting the partici‐
pants’ account values.242 The district court dismissed their claims after
applying the Ninth Circuit’s Quan presumption of prudence, and alter‐
natively, assuming the presumption did not apply, on the ground that
the defendants had not violated their fiduciary duties.243 The Ninth Cir‐
cuit reversed the dismissal, holding that the Quan presumption of pru‐
dence no longer applied as a result of Dudenhoeffer and, in the absence
of the presumption, the plaintiffs had sufficiently alleged a violation of
ERISA’s fiduciary duties (referred to as Harris I).244 Its reasoning was
twofold:


While removing the employer stock as a plan investment op‐
tion would have sent a negative signal to the public, which
may have caused a drop in the stock price, several factors

239. See generally Amgen Inc. v. Harris, 136 S. Ct. 758 (2016).
240. Harris v. Amgen, Inc., No. CV 07‐5442, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26283 at *4
(C.D. Cal. Mar. 2, 2010).
241. Id.
242. Id.
243. See id.
244. Harris v. Amgen, Inc. (Harris I), 738 F.3d 1026, 1047 (9th Cir. 2013).
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mitigated such a result, making it highly unlikely that the fi‐
duciary’s action could have negatively impacted the stock
price;245 and
“If defendants had revealed material information in a timely
fashion to the general public . . . .. . . thereby allowing in‐
formed plan participants to decide whether to invest . . . . they
would have simultaneously satisfied their duties under both
the securities laws and ERISA.”246

The defendants in Harris I petitioned for writ of certiorari, which
the Supreme Court granted; the Supreme Court then vacated and re‐
manded the Ninth Circuit’s decision for reconsideration in light of the
issues of the Dudenhoeffer decision.247
On remand, the Ninth Circuit again reversed the district court’s
dismissal—arguing that the complaint properly stated a claim for
breach of fiduciary duty—and denied the fiduciaries’ petition for re‐
hearing en banc (“Harris II”).248 It acknowledged that the plaintiffs had
shown it was “plausible” that the Amgen stock was “artificially in‐
flated” as a result of material misrepresentations and omissions by
company officers.249 The court concluded that if the alleged misrepre‐
sentations and omissions were sufficient to state a claim that the de‐
fendants violated federal securities law, they are certainly sufficient to
state a claim that the defendants violated ERISA’s duty of care.250 The
Harris II decision was the first instance of a court of appeals applying
Dudenhoeffer.
The Supreme Court reversed and remanded the Ninth Circuit’s
second decision, in a single order and per curiam opinion, signaling
that the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation of Dudenhoeffer neglected to ap‐
ply its new rigorous pleading standards.251 The Court stated that the
Ninth Circuit had failed to assess whether the complaint in its current
form “has plausibly alleged” that a prudent fiduciary in the same posi‐
tion “could not have concluded” that the alternative action “would do
more harm than good.”252 The Court then examined the complaint and
245. Id. at 1041.
246. Id. at 1041–42.
247. Amgen Inc. v. Harris, 134 S. Ct. 2870, 2871 (2014).
248. Harris v. Amgen, Inc. (Harris II), 788 F.3d 916, 945–46 (9th Cir. 2014), denying
petition for rehearing en banc and amending and replacing prior opinion at 770 F.3d 865
(9th Cir. 2014).
249. Harris II, 788 F.3d at 921.
250. Id. at 942.
251. Amgen Inc. v. Harris, 136 S. Ct. 758, 760 (2016).
252. Id. at 759–60 (quoting from Fifth Third Bancorp v. Dudenhoeffer, 573 U.S.
409, 429–30 (2014)).
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found there were not sufficient facts and allegations to state a claim for
breach of the duty of prudence.253 This decision signaled to the courts
to rigorously review the terms of the complaint and reject conclusory
assertions of an ERISA fiduciary breach, so as to “divide the plausible
sheep from the meritless goats.”254
In Laffen v. Hewlett‐Packard Co., an unpublished opinion, the Ninth
Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of plaintiffs’ complaint on
the grounds that it did not meet the Dudenhoeffer standard for a breach
of duty of prudence on the basis of inside information.255 Current and
former employees of Hewlett‐Packard Company (HP) initiated a class
action against the plan fiduciaries by purchasing and holding HP com‐
mon stock in HP’s 401(k) Savings Plan, even though the stock was arti‐
ficially inflated.256 HP had attempted to acquire Autonomy Corporation
PLC (“Autonomy”), a British software company.257 The plaintiffs al‐
leged that HP hid knowledge of Autonomy’s inflated stock value until
a whistleblower forced it to investigate and disclose the results.258 For
purposes of stating a claim for a breach of fiduciary duty on the basis
of inside information, the plaintiffs alleged that HP should have first
investigated the whistleblower’s allegations before taking action, as a
prudent fiduciary would have first investigated the problem before act‐
ing.259 The court rejected that this was an alternative action that the de‐
fendants could have taken, consistent with securities law, and one that
a “similarly situated prudent fiduciary would not have viewed as more
likely to harm than help the plan.”260 Thus, it held that the plaintiffs
failed to plead a claim for breach of the fiduciary duty of prudence in
this context.261
B.

Second Circuit analysis

In In re Citigroup ERISA Litig., participants in a Citigroup defined
contribution plan alleged various defendant executives were responsi‐
ble for the plans’ investments and subsequently violated their fiduciary
253.
254.
255.
256.
257.
258.
259.
260.
261.

Amgen Inc., 134 S. Ct. at 759–60.
Id. at 310.
Laffen v. Hewlett‐Packard Co., 721 F. App’x 642, 644 (9th Cir. 2018).
Id. at 643.
Id.
Id. at 644.
Id.
Id. at 643.
Id. at 644.
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duty of prudence to continue to hold and buy company stock in light
of its decline in value.262 The district court rejected their claims that the
defendants knew or should have known that Citigroup stock was an
imprudent investment based on public information as they did not
point to any “special circumstances,” as required by Dudenhoeffer, that
would render reliance on the market price to be impudent.263 Thus, their
duty‐of‐prudence claim based on publicly available information was
dismissed.264 As to the plaintiffs’ claim that the defendants failed to act
prudently in response to nonpublic information, the court dismissed
that claim as well.265 The plaintiffs argued disclosure of any nonpublic
information could not have caused the stock price to move noticeability
in light of all the negative public information about Citigroup.266 Thus,
they argued the purported nonpublic information that could have been
disclosed was immaterial.267 The court rejected that argument, because
the plaintiffs did not show that there was nonpublic information that
“would have altered the ‘total mix’ of available knowledge,” they did
not show that the information was material.268 The Second Circuit af‐
firmed the district court, noting the claim regarding nonpublic infor‐
mation failed because the appellants did not allege an alternative action
that a prudent fiduciary could have taken that it would not have
viewed as more likely to harm the fund than to help it, quoting from
Dudenhoeffer.269
In Rinehart v. Lehman Bros. Holdings Inc., the Second Circuit af‐
firmed the district court’s dismissal of the plaintiff’s third consolidated
amended complaint, alleging breach of duties by the fiduciaries of an
ESOP, invested exclusively in Lehman Brothers Holdings, Inc. (“Leh‐
man”) stock.270 The plaintiff’s alleged that the SEC’s orders prohibited
the short‐selling of securities of certain financial services firms, which
included Lehman, constituted “special circumstances” under the
262. In re Citigroup ERISA Litig., 104 F. Supp. 3d 599, 602–03 (S.D.N.Y. 2015),
aff’d sub nom. Muehlgay v. Citigroup, Inc., 649 F. App’x 110 (2d Cir. 2016), cert. denied,
137 S. Ct. 583 (2016).
263. Id. at 615.
264. Id. at 616.
265. Id.
266. Id.
267. Id. at 616–17.
268. Id. at 617.
269. Muehlgay v. Citigroup, Inc., 649 F. App’x 110, 112 (2d Cir. 2016), cert. denied,
137 S. Ct. 583 (2016).
270. Rinehart v. Lehman Brothers Holding, Inc., 817 F.3d 56, 63 (2d Cir. 2016),
cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 1067 (2017).
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Dudenhoeffer criteria such that the fiduciaries should not have relied
upon the market value of the employer stock.271 Because those SEC or‐
ders spoke only conditionally about market effects resulting from so‐
called naked short sales, they did not purport to describe the existing
market conditions.272 The court noted that the plaintiff’s “conclusory
assertions” did not give rise to a plausible inference that the SEC’s or‐
ders would have affected the market’s ability to value Lehman stock,
and thus, it need not decide whether such orders constituted “special
circumstances” under Dudenhoeffer.273 Thus, in the court’s eyes, the fi‐
duciary could rely on the market price as a shield against “all allega‐
tions of imprudence based upon public information.”274
The plaintiffs also alleged that the fiduciaries breached their du‐
ties by failing to investigate nonpublic information regarding the risks
of Lehman.275 The Second Circuit rejected this allegation as the com‐
plaint failed to explain how such investigation would have uncovered
any inside information, as Dudenhoeffer requires the plaintiff to allege
facts which would show that such an adequate investigation would
have revealed to a prudent fiduciary that the investment was “improv‐
ident.”276 Moreover, the Second Circuit held that the plaintiffs did not
plausibly plead facts and allegations showing that a prudent fiduciary
would not have viewed disclosure of material nonpublic information
regarding Lehman or ceasing to buy Lehman stock as more likely to
harm the fund than to help it.277 Thus, the plaintiffs failed to plead plau‐
sibly that the defendants breached their fiduciary duties under ERISA
by failing to recognize the imminence of Lehman’s collapse.278
C.

Fourth Circuit analysis

In the case of Tatum v. RJR Pension Investment Committee, RJR
Nabisco (“Nabisco”) as plan fiduciary informed plan participants that
the Nabisco stock fund would be frozen, as it decided to spin off the
company’s food business from its tobacco business, and then would be

271.
272.
273.
274.
275.
276.
277.
278.

Id. at 66–67.
Id. at 67.
Id.
Id. at 66.
Id. at 61, 67.
Id. at 67.
Id. at 68 (quoting from Amgen Inc. v. Harris, 136 S. Ct. 758, 759 (2016).
Rinehart v. Lehman Brothers Holding, Inc., 817 F.3d 56, 68 (2d Cir. 2016).
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divested six months later.279 In the months following the spin‐off,
Nabisco stock declined sharply in value; however, months after the di‐
vestment, the value of the Nabisco stock increased dramatically in
value after being acquired by Philip Morris.280 Employees of Nabisco
sued the plan fiduciaries for breaching their fiduciary duty “by elimi‐
nating Nabisco stock from the Plan on an arbitrary timeline without
conducting a thorough investigation,”281 which then caused substantial
loss to the plan.282 The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s con‐
clusion that absent “special circumstances” when evaluating publicly
traded stock, the plan fiduciary may rely on the market price of the
Nabisco stock as the correct estimate of its value (consistent with the
efficient market theory hypothesis).283 It concluded that Nabisco’s ac‐
tions were consistent with what a prudent fiduciary “would have” de‐
cided when to divest and how to divest.284
D.

Fifth Circuit analysis

In September of 2016, the Fifth Circuit concluded a six‐year battle
against the executives of BP, P.L.C. (“BP”) as plan fiduciaries, for losses
in BP stock prices held in BP’s employee stock ownership plan, due to
the 2010 explosion of an offshore drilling rig causing a massive oil spill
in the Gulf of Mexico.285 As the original complaint had been filed pre‐
Dudenhoeffer, the district court initially dismissed the complaint on the
grounds that the ESOP fiduciaries were entitled to a presumption of
prudence under the Kirschbaum standard, which the plaintiffs failed to
overcome.286 The Fifth Circuit vacated the district court’s judgment and
remanded for reconsideration in light of the Supreme Court’s Duden‐
hoeffer decision.287

279. Tatum v. RJR Pension Inv. Comm., et al., 855 F.3d 553, 556 (4th Cir. 2017).
280. Id. at 556–57.
281. Id. at 557 (quoting from Tatum v. RJR Pension Inv. Comm., 761 F.3d 346,
355 (4th Cir. 2014)).
282. Id.
283. Tatum, 855 F.3d at 564.
284. Id. at 567.
285. Whitley v. BP, P.L.C., 838 F.3d 523, 529 (5th Cir. 2016).
286. Id. at 525–26; Kirschbaum v. Reliant Energy, Inc., 526 F.3d 243, 255 (5th Cir.
2008) (applying the Moench presumption of prudence).
287. Whitley v. BP, P.L.C., 575 F. App’x 341, 343 (5th Cir. 2014) (vacating the
judgement of the district court and remanding it for reconsideration in light of
Dudenhoeffer, as the district court had applied the Moench presumption).
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On remand, the complaint was amended and the district court
held that (1) the stockholders had plausibly alleged that the defendants
had inside information and (2) the stockholders had plausibly alleged
two alternative actions that the defendants could have taken that met
the Dudenhoeffer criteria: freezing, limiting, or restricting the purchase
of employer stock and disclosing unfavorable information to the pub‐
lic.288 The Fifth Circuit reversed and remanded, stating that the district
court altered the language of Dudenhoeffer in reaching its holdings.289
According to the Fifth Circuit, the district court stated that it could not
determine “on the basis of the pleadings alone, that no prudent fiduci‐
ary would have concluded that [the alternatives] would do more good
than harm.”290
The Fifth Circuit corrected the district court’s interpretation by
saying that the Dudenhoeffer language imposed a “significant burden”
on the plaintiff to propose an alternative course of action “so clearly ben‐
eficial that a prudent fiduciary could not conclude that it would be more
likely to harm the fund than to help it.”291 Thus, the plaintiff has the
burden of showing that the alternative action must do more than result‐
ing in a net gain to the fund; he or she must “plausibly allege that no
prudent fiduciary could have” made the opposite conclusion (i.e., that
such alternative would result in more harm than good).292 The Fifth Cir‐
cuit charged the stockholders with making “conclusory statements”
that did not demonstrate proposed alternatives that a prudent fiduciary
could not have concluded would do more harm than good.293 While the
stockholders alleged that the BP stock was overvalued due to “numer‐
ous undisclosed safety breaches” known only to insiders, that fact alone
was not sufficient to conclude that disclosure of such information or
freezing trades of BP stock (both of which would reduce the stock price)
would do more harm than good.294 In fact, the Fifth Court inferred a
prudent fiduciary would have concluded that such actions would do
more harm than good.295 As the stockholders failed to do so, their claim
should have been dismissed.296 The Fifth Circuit also failed to comment
288.
289.
290.
291.
292.
293.
294.
295.
296.

Id. at 526.
Id. at 528–29.
Id. at 529.
Id. (with emphasis added).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 523.
Id. at 529.
Id. at 523.
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on amicus briefs filed by the DOL and SEC which argued in favor of
public and prompt disclosure of all material nonpublic information.297
A year later, the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint.298 The Fifth
Circuit again framed the issue as to whether “plaintiffs [have] plausibly
allege[d] that no prudent fiduciary could have concluded” that public
disclosure of negative information would do more harm than good.299
In their amended complaint, the plaintiffs first alleged that public dis‐
closure of negative information should have been set forth in the ordi‐
nary Securities and Exchange Commission’s public filings.300 Secondly,
to qualify the effect of such disclosure, the plaintiffs brought in testimo‐
nies of financial markets experts.301 Such arguments fell on deaf ears, as
the Fifth Circuit held that such allegations failed to show how public
disclosure would have led to improved results.302
Two years later, in Martone v. Robb,303 the Fifth Circuit affirmed
the district court’s dismissal of the plaintiff’s claims against executives
of Whole Foods, as plan fiduciaries, for continuing to hold Whole Foods
stock in the company’s ESOP.304 Martone alleged that the company
stock was artificially inflated as a result of “undisclosed misrepresenta‐
tion and fraud,” as Whole Foods had been involved in “systemic, illegal
297. See generally Brief for the Department of Labor as Amicus Curiae, in Sup‐
port of the Plaintiff‐Appellees, Whitley v. BP, P.L.C., No. 15‐20282 (5th Cir. 2016);
Brief for the SEC as Amicus Curiae in Support of the Plaintiffs‐Appellees, Whitley
v. BP, P.L.C., No. 15‐2028 (5th Cir. 2016) (The DOL had argued that plaintiff‐appel‐
lees had satisfied the “more harm than good” standard by alleging at least two ac‐
tions that the defendants could have taken: freeze the stock fund and, if necessary,
make a public disclosure, consistent with the securities laws, that a prudent fiduci‐
ary could not have concluded would do more harm than good given the continuous
fraud. In the wake of an ongoing fraud, the fiduciary’s objectives, under both ERISA
and the securities law, must be to halt the fraud and prevent the plan from continu‐
ing to hold and buy overvalued stock. In its amicus brief, the SEC argued that the
alternative actions set forth by the DOL are not inconsistent with the federal securi‐
ties laws or their objectives. If the ESOP manager engages in a fraud by making
misstatements or omissions, he/she owed a duty to make a public disclosure of the
falsehood. If the ESOP manager was not responsible for the fraud but knows of it,
he/she may elect to disclose it publicly. In the SEC’s view, an ESOP manager aware
of the employer’s undisclosed fraud will not violate securities law by refraining
from both purchases and sales of employer stock within the plan.).
298. In re BP P.L.C. Sec. Litig., No. 10‐cv‐4214, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 33302, at *78
(S.D. Tex. Mar. 8, 2017).
299. Id. (citing Whitley v. BP, P.L.C., 838 F.3d 523, 523 (5th Cir. 2016)).
300. Id. at *76–77.
301. Id.
302. Id. at *83–84.
303. Martone v. Robb, 902 F.3d 519, 528 (5th Cir. 2018).
304. Id. at 521.
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overcharging of its customers” by “regularly misstat[ing] the weight of
pre‐packaged food on which prices were based.”305 The company had
been investigated, during this time period, by a number of governmen‐
tal agencies in California and New York, resulting in fines and a per‐
manent injunction to prohibit to engaged in practices that involved
products sold by weight.306 It too had disclosed in its Form 8‐K filing
that the company’s stock price declined over eleven percent.307
As a result of the alleged fraud, Martone, a former Whole Foods
employee, claimed that the defendants should have made corrective,
public disclosures to cure such fraud.308 He argued that disclosing the
fraudulent conduct earlier would have reduced the damage as “the
longer a fraud of a public company like Whole Foods persists, the
harsher the correction is likely to be when that fraud is finally re‐
vealed.”309 The district court rejected that argument as it concluded that
“in virtually every fraud case,” a prudent fiduciary could have con‐
cluded that taking such action to expose fraudulent conduct might do
more harm than good.310 The Fifth Circuit agreed that fraud disclosures
and the decline in stock price that subsequently followed were insuffi‐
cient under the Whitley standard.311
The court also dismissed the plaintiff’s claim that the plan would
be a net purchaser of the stock during the class period and thus, any
benefit to the sellers should have been factored into court’s analysis as
to whether earlier disclosure would cause more harm than good.312 The
court noted such an argument flies in the face of ERISA’s duty of pru‐
dence which is determined “under the circumstances then prevail‐
ing,”313 and not with the benefit from hindsight.314 Thus, the Fifth Cir‐
cuit affirmed the dismissal as Martone failed to allege alternative
actions that a prudent fiduciary “would not have viewed as more likely
to harm the fund than to help it.”315

305.
306.
307.
308.
309.
310.
311.
312.
313.
314.
315.

Id. at 521–22 (internal quotations omitted).
Id. at 522.
Id.
Id. at 521, 525.
Id. at 526.
Id.
Id. at 527.
Id.
29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(B).
Martone v. Robb, 902 F.3d 519, 527 (5th Cir. 2018).
Id. at 529.
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Eleventh Circuit analysis

In Smith v. Delta Air Lines, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the dis‐
trict court’s decision to dismiss a lawsuit by plan participants of a Delta
Air Lines (“Delta”) ESOP for breach of their fiduciary duty of prudence
under Dudenhoeffer.316 The lawsuit had alleged that the fiduciaries im‐
prudently invested in the employer stock in light of the disappointing
financial performance, loss in competitive advantage, and concerns
about the employer’s ability to survive in its industry.317 By the fiduci‐
aries’ failure to investigate the viability of the Delta stock and its adher‐
ence to the plan document, regardless of the harm to the participants,
the plaintiffs alleged that the fiduciaries breached their duty of pru‐
dence.318 On remand and relying on the Dudenhoeffer criteria, the Elev‐
enth Circuit found these claims implausible on the grounds that “spe‐
cial circumstances” (such as fraud, improper accounting, or illegal
conduct) were not alleged to show that the fiduciaries’ reliance on the
market price of the stock was imprudent.319 The court also noted that
there was no allegation in the complaint that the fiduciary had material
inside information about Delta’s financial condition that had not been
disclosed to the market.320
F.

Seventh Circuit analysis

In Allen v. GreatBanc Trust Co., the Seventh Circuit reversed the
district court’s dismissal of the plaintiffs’ complaint as they had not suf‐
ficiently pleaded a breach of fiduciary duty according to the Dudenhoef‐
fer standard by showing “special circumstances” that the plan stock had
been undervalued.321 The employer was a privately held company and
appointed GreatBanc in 2010, as trustee of the ESOP, for the purpose of
representing the plan in purchasing shares in the company for $60 mil‐
lion, secured with a loan from the selling shareholders.322 Twenty‐two
days later, the plan’s stock was alleged to have declined by twenty‐two
316. Smith v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 619 F. App’x 874 (11th Cir. 2015). The Su‐
preme Court had vacated the Eleventh Circuit’s prior ruling in favor of the fiduci‐
aries and remanded the case for reconsideration in light of Dudenhoeffer. Smith v.
Delta Air Lines Inc., 563 F. App’x 681 (11th Cir. 2014), vacated and remanded, 135 S.
Ct. 1421 (2015).
317. Smith, 619 F. App’x. at 875.
318. Id.
319. Id. at 876.
320. Id.
321. Allen v. GreatBanc Trust Co., 835 F.3d 670, 681 (7th Cir. 2016).
322. Id. at 673.
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percent; by late 2011, its value had declined by almost fifty percent.323
By December 2013, its shares were worth only $26.6 million.324 Employ‐
ees Lisa Allen and Misty Dalton brought suit, alleging a breach of fidu‐
ciary duty claim due to the decline in the value of the stock.325 The dis‐
trict court dismissed the complaint believing that the Dudenhoeffer
standard of “special circumstances” applied, as it found that no special
circumstances existed.326 The Seventh Circuit reversed as it held the
Dudenhoeffer standard regarding the value of the stock did not apply in
the context of a private‐stock situation.327 As a result, the plaintiff need
only plead a breach of fiduciary duty, such as prudence, and explain
how the breach occurred.328
G.

Sixth Circuit analysis

In Saumer v. Cliffs Natural Resources, Inc., the Sixth Circuit affirmed
the district court’s dismissal of the plaintiffs’ stock drop complaint.329
Cliffs Natural Resources (“Cliffs”) employees who were participants in
an ESOP alleged that the plan fiduciaries, consisting of the plan’s in‐
vestment committee members and Cliffs corporate officers, breached
their fiduciary duty by retaining Cliffs stock as an investment option.330
Due to a 2012 global demand slump, the Cliffs stock lost ninety‐five
percent of its value between 2011 and 2015, as compared to a roughly
fifty percent gain for the broader market during the same time period.331
The plaintiffs alleged that the fiduciary’s decision to invest in the Cliffs
stock was imprudent because the company’s risk profile and business
prospects had declined precipitously during the class period.332 The
court rejected this argument as it applied the Dudenhoeffer standard in
both contexts—whether the company stock was overvalued or exces‐
sively risky—thereby allowing the plan fiduciaries to rely on the

323. Id.
324. Id.
325. Id.
326. Dalton v. GreatBanc Trust Co., No. 15 C 3053, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 133711
at * 7 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 1, 2015).
327. Allen v. GreatBanc Trust Co., 835 F.3d at 679–80.
328. Id. at 679.
329. Saumer v. Cliffs Natural Resources, Inc., 853 F.3d 855 (6th Cir. 2017).
330. Id. at 858.
331. Id.
332. Id. at 860.
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market price.333 While the district court had also rejected this argument,
it reasoned that the only way to plead “special circumstances” was to
demonstrate that Cliffs traded on an inefficient market.334 The Sixth Cir‐
cuit concluded that the “special circumstances” exception encom‐
passed more than market inefficiency, such that it did not require the
fiduciary to independently verify the accuracy of the market price.335
The plaintiffs also alleged that the fiduciaries should have used
their inside information to prevent ESOP losses by disclosing such in‐
formation to correct the market price and to direct new contributions to
the plan to be held in cash, in lieu of company stock.336 Again, the Sixth
Circuit rejects this claim as falling short of the Dudenhoeffer standard on
nonpublic‐information claims.337 In fact, the court notes that divulging
inside information may have collapsed Cliff’s stock price, hurting par‐
ticipants even more, and that closing the fund without any explanation
could leave the market with insufficient information gauge the stock’s
true value.338

VII. The Jander v. IBM Exception to Stock‐Drop
Litigation Trends
Jander v. Retirement Plans Committee of IBM339 provided a rare ex‐
ception to the post‐Dudenhoeffer litigation trends.340 In direct conflict
333. Id. at 862 (quoting Fifth Third Bancorp v. Dudenhoeffer, 573 U.S. 409, 413
(2014)).
334. Saumer, 853 F.3d at 862.
335. Id.
336. Id. at 863.
337. Id. at 864 (citing Harris v. Amgen, Inc., 788 F.3d 916 (9th Cir. 2014) (Harris
II), Whitley v. BP, P.L.C., 838 F.3d 523 (5th Cir. 2016), and Rinehart v. Lehman Broth‐
ers Holdings Inc., 817 F.3d 56 (2d Cir. 2016), for the proposition that disclosing in‐
side information and stopping additional ESOP contributions fail to meet the re‐
quired alternative action required by Dudenhoeffer).
338. Saumer, 853 F.3d at 864 (quoting from Harris II, 788 F.3d at 925–26).
339. Ret. Plans Comm. of IBM v. Jander, 910 F.3d 620 (2d Cir. 2018), vacated and
remanded, 140 S. Ct. 592 (2020), reinstated, 962 F.3d 85 (2d Cir. 2020) cert denied, 141 S.
Ct. 816 (Nov. 2020).
340. Amgen Inc. v Harris, 136 S. Ct. 758 (2016); Harris v. Amgen, Inc., No. CV
07‐5442, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26283 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 2, 2010); Harris I, 738 F.3d 1026
(9th Cir. 2013); Amgen Inc. v. Harris, 134 S. Ct. 2870 (2014); Harris II, 788 F.3d 916
(9th Cir. 2014); Laffen v. Hewlett‐Packard Co., 721 F. App’x 642 (9th Cir. 2018); In re
Citigroup ERISA Litig., 104 F. Supp. 3d 599 (S.D.N.Y. 2015); Muehlgay v. Citigroup,
Inc., 649 F. App’x 110 (2d Cir. 2016); Rinehart v. Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc., 817
F.3d 56 (2d Cir. 2016); Tatum v. RJR Pension Inv. Comm., et al., 855 F.3d 553 (4th
Cir. 2014); Whitley v. BP, P.L.C., 838 F.3d 523 (5th Cir. 2016); Whitley v. BP, P.L.C.,
575 F. App’x 341 (5th Cir. 2014); In re BP P.L.C. Sec. Litig., No. 10‐cv‐4214, 2017 U.S.
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with the Fifth Circuit’s Martone decision discussed earlier, the Second
Circuit in Jander upheld the plaintiffs’ claim that the defendants vio‐
lated their ERISA duty of prudence, sufficient to survive a motion to
dismiss, by continuing to hold IBM stock which they knew, based on
nonpublic information, was overvalued.341
The plaintiffs were participants in IBM’s ESOP and the defend‐
ants were fiduciaries who oversaw the retirement plan’s management,
as well as members of IBM’s senior management.342 IBM had been try‐
ing to locate a buyer of its microelectronics business, which had been
incurring significant annual losses that IBM and its executives failed to
publicly disclose, resulting in the overvalue of IBM stock.343 The plain‐
tiffs pleaded that the defendants should have either made an “early cor‐
rective disclosure” about the true value of the Microelectronics’ busi‐
ness344 or issued new investment guidelines that would have allowed
the defendants to freeze continued investment in IBM stock.345 They
later amended their complaint to allege a third alternative by which the
defendants could have acted upon: by acquiring hedging products to
lessen further decline in the value of IBM stock.346 The district court
“found lacking” the three allegations (i.e., disclosure, halting trades of
IBM stock, or buying a hedging product), deciding that each would
have caused more harm than good.347 Thus, it dismissed the case.348
The Second Circuit (before a panel of three judges, Chief Judge
Katzmann, Judge Sack, and Judge Raggi) reversed on the following
grounds:


The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants knew that the IBM
stock was overvalued as a result of accounting violations and
they were aware that the Microelectronics unit was impaired,
which would have affected the price of the stock.349

Dist. LEXIS 33302 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 8, 2017; Martone v. Robb, 902 F.3d 519 (5th Cir.
2018); Smith v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 619 F. App’x 874 (11th Cir. 2015); Allen v. Great‐
Banc Trust Co., 835 F.3d 670 (7th Cir. 2016); Dalton v. GreatBanc Trust Co., No. 15 C
3053, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 133711 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 1, 2015); Saumer, 853 F.3d 855.
341. Jander, 910 F.3d at 620.
342. Id. at 623.
343. Id.
344. Id. at 628.
345. Id. at 623.
346. Id. at 624.
347. Id. (citing to Jander v. Ret. Plans Comm. of IBM, 272 F. Supp. 3d 444, 451–
54 (S.D.N.Y. 2017).
348. Ret. Plans Comm. of IBM v. Jander, 910 F.3d at 620, 620 (2d Cir. 2018).
349. Id.
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Two of the defendants “were uniquely situated to fix this
problem … as they had primary responsibility for the public
disclosures that had artificially inflated the stock price to begin
with.”350 Disclosure of the inflated value of the stock price
could have been include in IBM’s quarterly SEC filing and dis‐
closed to the ESOP participants and beneficiaries at the same
time. Such failure to disclose impaired management’s credibil‐
ity and impacted the viability of IBM stock as an investment
because “the eventual disclosure of a prolonged fraud causes
‘reputational damage’ that ‘increases the longer the fraud goes
on.’”351 The court noted that economic analyses mentioned by
the plaintiffs supported the theory that reputational harm to
the company is a predictable result of fraud, and the longer the
fraud is kept secret, the greater its impact on the stock price.352
A prudent fiduciary would not have to worry that such disclo‐
sure would unduly impact the price of the stock as it was
traded in an efficient market.353
In this situation, disclosure of the “longstanding company
fraud” was “inevitable” as IBM was likely to sell the microe‐
lectronics unit, and, at that point, the public would be made
aware of the stock’s overvaluation.354 This issue was highly
relevant to the court as the typical stock drop case involves the
plan fiduciary comparing only “the status quo of non‐disclo‐
sure” in assessing whether the disclosure would have done
more harm than good, whereas in this case non‐disclosure was
no longer an option.355 Hence, when disclosure of the fraud is
“inevitable,” a prudent fiduciary would tend to “limit the ef‐
fects of the stock’s artificial inflation on the ESOP’s beneficiar‐
ies through prompt disclosure.”356 The court rejected the de‐
fendants’ argument that earlier corrective disclosure would
not “sufficiently account for the effect of disclosure on ‘the
value of the stock already held by the fund.’”357 Since disclo‐
sure of IBM’s troubles was inevitable, the drop in the stock
price following an earlier disclosure would not be more harm‐
ful than the drop in price following a later disclosure.358 Thus,
the court affirmed that Jander had sufficiently pleaded a com‐
plaint that no prudent fiduciary would have concluded that
earlier disclosure would do more harm than good, and the

350. Id.
351. Jander, 910 F.3d at 629 (quoting the district court’s case at Jander, 272 F.
Supp. 3d at 450).
352. Jander, 910 F.3d at 629.
353. Id. at 630.
354. Id.
355. Id.
356. Id.
357. Id. at 631 (citation omitted).
358. Id.
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ruling of the lower court is to be reversed and remanded for
further proceeding.359
Thus, the Second Circuit’s “inevitable disclosure” theory can
be summarized as follows: when “non‐disclosure of IBM’s
troubles [is] no longer a realistic option” and “a stock‐drop fol‐
lowing early disclosure would be no more harmful than the
inevitable stock drop that would occur following a later dis‐
closure,” the plaintiff has sufficiently pleaded that no prudent
fiduciary could have concluded that earlier disclosure would
do more harm than good.360

The plaintiff’s triumph against IBM in Jander led to similar ESOP
claims against Johnson & Johnson,361 Edison International,362 and Gen‐
eral Electric;363 these will be discussed in Part VIII of this Article. While
there had been a decline in stock drop litigation post‐Dudenhoeffer, the
plaintiff’s bar had hoped that the Jander exception would revive litiga‐
tion, especially if the face of a market decline in which employer stock
has decreased in value.364
Due to litigants’ continued failure to meet the lofty Dudenhoeffer
pleading standard in the district and circuit courts, the Supreme Court
granted certiorari in Jander.365 Plaintiffs hoped that the Supreme Court
would affirm the Second Circuit’s “inevitable disclosure” theory and
open the door to greater stock‐drop litigation.366 The Supreme Court
granted the Government’s motion to take part in oral argument as an
amicus curiae in support of neither party, but in order to present the

359. Id.
360. Id.
361. See Perrone v. Johnson & Johnson, No. 19‐00923, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 36230
(D.N.J. Feb. 26, 2021).
362. See Wilson v. Craver, 994 F.3d 1085 (9th Cir. 2021).
363. See Varga v. Gen. Elec. Co., No. 18‐cv‐1449, 2020 WL 1064809 (N.D.N.Y.
Mar. 5, 2020).
364. See Nevin E. Adams, Full Court ‘Press’?, NAT’L ASS’N OF PLAN ADVISORS
(Oct. 28, 2019), available at https://www.napa‐net.org/news‐info/daily‐news/full‐
court‐press; see also 29 U.S.C. § 1132(e)(2) (Providing ERISA permits the proper
venue for an action to be determined as follows: (1) where the plan is administered;
(2) where the breach occurred; or (3) where at least one defendant resides or is
found.). See 29 U.S.C. § 1132(e)(2). Plaintiffs may choose to bring stock drop litiga‐
tion in New York (within the Second Circuit) as it would be more likely to find a
fiduciary within New York, thereby increasing the potential for successful litigation.
In the case of Smith v. Aegon Cos. Pension Plan, 769 F.3d 922 (6th Cir. 2014), however,
the Sixth Circuit affirmed the use of the plan’s venue provision. This may cause
more plan sponsors to select venue for any litigation outside of the Second Circuit,
in order to withstand successful litigation on the part of the plaintiffs.
365. Ret. Plans Comm. of IBM v. Jander, 139 U.S. 2667 (2019) (mem.).
366. Id.
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opinions of both the Department of Labor and the SEC.367 In its brief per
curiam decision, the Supreme Court vacated the Second Circuit’s rul‐
ing.368 The issue posed by the Court was whether Dudenhoeffer’s “more
harm than good” pleading standard is met by “generalized allegations
that the harm of an inevitable disclosure of an alleged fraud generally
increases over time.”369 The Court began with a recitation of the Duden‐
hoeffer standard in the context of an alleged fiduciary breach of pru‐
dence based on inside information.370 First, ERISA does not require the
fiduciary to violate securities law in exercising its duty of prudence.371
Second, in deciding whether the fiduciaries should halt purchasing
stock on the basis of inside information or disclose inside information,
courts should assess whether such action would conflict with insider
trading and federal securities law disclosure requirements.372 At the
time of the Dudenhoeffer decision, the Court noted that it did not know
the SEC’s opinion on the matter.373 And finally, the plaintiff must allege
that a prudent fiduciary could not have concluded that refraining from
stock purchases (which the market might view as a sign that the insider
fiduciaries were acting on inside information) or disclosing negative in‐
formation would do more harm than good to the fund by causing the
price of the stock to drop.374
The Supreme Court declined to rule on the merits of the issue in
Jander.375 It noted that the defendants and the Government (via the SEC
and DOL’s amicus briefs) “focused their arguments primarily upon
other matters” that previously had not been made.376 The defendants
argued that ERISA imposed no duty on fiduciaries to act on inside in‐
formation, whereas the Government argued an ERISA duty to disclose
insider information (not otherwise required to be disclosed under secu‐
rities law) “would ‘conflict’ at least with ‘objectives of’ the ‘complex in‐
sider trading and corporate disclosure requirements imposed by the

367.
368.
369.
370.
371.
372.
373.
374.
375.
376.

Ret. Plans Comm. of IBM v. Jander, 140 U.S. 398 (2019) (mem.).
Ret. Plans Comm. of IBM v. Jander, 140 U.S. 592, 595 (2020) (per curiam).
Id. at 594 (internal quotation and citation omitted).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 594–95.
See id. at 595.
Id.
Id. at 595.
Id. at 594–95.
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federal securities laws. . .’”377 As the Second Circuit failed to address
these arguments, the case was remanded.378
In her concurrence, Justice Kagan (joined by Justice Ginsburg)
first noted that the Second Circuit may not decide to consider the argu‐
ments raised by the Government as they were not raised in the first in‐
stance.379 If the court, however, does choose to address such issues, the
argument that ERISA imposes no duty on an ESOP fiduciary to act
upon inside information squarely conflicts with the Dudenhoeffer deci‐
sion, which made “clear that an ESOP fiduciary at times has such a
duty.”380 As to the Government’s argument that absent extraordinary
circumstances, an ESOP fiduciary need only disclose inside information
required by the federal securities laws, she remarks that Dudenhoeffer
“explains that when an action does not so conflict, it might fall within
an ESOP fiduciary’s duty—even if the securities laws do not require
it.”381
In his concurrence, Justice Gorsuch focused on the initial question
of distinguishing between an individual’s fiduciary duties versus
his/her duties as a corporate officer, as the respondents seek to impose
an “even higher duty” on fiduciaries who are in a position to order SEC‐
regulated disclosures.382 He observed that Dudenhoeffer was silent on
the question as “whether ERISA plaintiffs may hold fiduciaries liable
for alternative actions they could have taken only in a nonfiduciary ca‐
pacity.”383 He remarked that because ERISA holds fiduciaries liable
only for actions taken while acting as a fiduciary, “it would be odd to
hold the same fiduciaries liable for ‘alternative action[s they] could
have taken’ only in some other capacity.”384
Upon remand, the Second Circuit (before the panel of three judges
who were the same judges that held in favor of the plaintiffs in the first
Jander decision) permitted the parties to provide supplemental briefs,
including whether the court should consider arguments not previously
raised before the court. It also permitted the government to supply a

377.
378.
379.
380.
381.
382.
383.
384.

Id. (quoting Fifth Third Bancorp v. Dudenhoeffer, 573 U.S. 409, 429 (2014)).
Id. at 595.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 595–96.
Id. at 596.
Id. at 597.
Id. at 596 (citation omitted).
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supplemental brief as an amicus curiae.385 Upon its remand, the Second
Circuit issued a per curiam opinion, reinstating its initial judgment.386
As for arguments that had been previously considered, the court de‐
clined to review them; as for arguments not initially considered, the
court declined to permit them.387 Thus, the judgment of the district
court remained reversed, and the case was to be remanded consistent
with the Second Circuit’s initial opinion.388 On April 2, 2021, the parties
settled the case of $4.75 million, which was approved by the district
court in the Southern District of New York,389 concluding six years of
litigation.

385. See Jander v. Ret. Plans Comm. of IBM, 910 F.3d 620 (2d Cir. 2018), vacated,
140 U.S. 592 (2020), reinstated, 962 F.3d 85, 86 (2d Cir. 2020) (Jander II), Ret. Plans
Comm. of IBM v. Jander, and cert. denied, 141 U.S. 816 (2020) (mem.).
386. Id.
387. Jander, 962 F.3d at 86. The reinstatement of the original Jander decision was
made by the same panel of Circuit Court Judges who heard the initial Jander decision
in the Second Circuit (Judges Katzmann (Chief Judge), Sack, and Raggi.
388. Id., cert. denied, see Ret. Plans Comm. of IBM v. Jander, 141 U.S. 816 (2020).
389. See Jander v. Ret. Plans Comm. of IBM, No. 15cv3781, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
136958 (S.D.N.Y. July 22, 2021).
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VIII. The Aftermath of Jander
Decisions in the aftermath of Jander confirm that it was an outlier.
In six recent decisions involving ESOPs sponsored by Target, Wells
Fargo, Johnson & Johnson, General Electric, Gannett Company, and Ed‐
ison Company, the federal courts have rejected the Jander “inevitable
theory” and held that such theories fail the Dudenhoeffer “no more harm
than good” test.
A.

Eighth Circuit analysis post‐Jander

In Allen v. Wells Fargo & Co., the participants of Wells Fargo’s
ESOP sued Wells Fargo and fiduciaries of the plan for breach of their
ERISA duties of prudence and loyalty by failing to disclose unethical
sales methods that resulted in a decline in the price of the employer’s
stock.390 As early as 2004, Wells Fargo and its senior management im‐
posed unreasonably high sales quotas on its branch employees, which
resulted in widespread illegal and unethical sales practices, including
the use of confidential and personal information of its customers.391 By
2013, the government regulators were investigating Wells Fargo’s pos‐
sible misconduct. The fraud was not disclosed to the public until 2016,
which resulted in a drastic decline in the market value of the company
stock.392 Participants in Wells Fargo’s ESOP and its 401(k) plan, which
offered the Wells Fargo Stock Fund, suffered losses as a result of the
stock’s market decline.393 They brought suit under ERISA against the
defendants for breaches of the duties of prudence and loyalty by failing
to take corrective measures to protect the plan participant, such as pub‐
licly disclosing the unethical practices, freezing investment in the em‐
ployer stock, or procuring a hedging product.394
The district court dismissed the breach of duty of prudence com‐
plaint as it failed to plausibly allege that a prudent fiduciary could not
have concluded that the proposed alternative actions would do more
harm than good to the stock fund in accordance with Dudenhoeffer.395
The court also dismissed the breach of duty of loyalty complaint,
390. See Allen v. Wells Fargo & Co., 967 F.3d 767 (8th Cir. 2020).
391. Id. at 770–71.
392. Id. at 771 (stating Wells Fargo lost more than $18 billion in market capitali‐
zation between the close of market on September 7, 2016, and September 15, 2016).
393. Id.
394. Id.
395. Id.
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holding that, although Dudenhoeffer did not apply to such claim, the
plaintiffs’ allegations were insufficient to plausibly plead such a
claim.396
The plan participants appealed, arguing two proposed alternative
actions that the defendants could have taken: public disclosure of the
unethical sales practices and freezing purchases of the Wells Fargo
Stock Funds.397 The Eighth Circuit focused on the public disclosure al‐
ternative as the defendants could not have frozen purchases of em‐
ployer stock without also disclosing the unethical sales practices.398 The
court began its reasoning by acknowledging that most circuits have re‐
jected the argument that public disclosure of negative information is a
viable alternative action in an imprudence claim based on inside infor‐
mation.399 It rejected the appellants’ argument that, in this case, public
disclosure of the fraud was inevitable, and due to general economic
principles, the longer the fraud is suppressed, the greater the harm to
the company and its stock price.400 While the court acknowledged that
the Second Circuit in the Jander decision had found that the plaintiffs
had plausibly alleged that the prudent fiduciary in the defendant’s po‐
sition could not have concluded that earlier disclosure would do more
harm than good, it rejected such argument as being “too generic” to
meet the Dudenhoeffer standard.401 According to the court, even if public
disclosure is inevitable and could have “ameliorate[d] some harm to
the company’s stock price,” such “course of action was not so clearly
beneficial that a prudent fiduciary could not conclude that it would be
more likely to harm the fund than to help it.”402 Thus, it dismissed the
plaintiff’s breach of duty of prudence complaint.403

396. Id. at 772.
397. Id. at 773.
398. Id.
399. Id. (citing Singh v. RadioShack Corp., 882 F.3d 137, 149 (5th Cir. 2018) (per
curiam); Saumer v. Cliffs Nat. Res. Inc., 853 F.3d 855, 864–65 (6th Cir. 2017); Whitley
v. BP, P.L.C., 838 F.3d 523, 529 (5th Cir. 2016)).
400. Allen v. Wells Fargo & Co., 967 F.3d 767, 773–74 (8th Cir. 2020)(citing Mar‐
tone v. Robb, 902 F.3d 519 (5th Cir. 2018)); Whitley, 838 F.3d at 529; Laffen v. Hewlett‐
Packard Co., 721 F. App’x 642, 644 (9th Cir. 2018) (per curiam)).
401. Allen, 967 F.3d at 774.
402. Id. at 775 (quoting from Graham v. Fearon, 721 F. App’x 429, 437 (6th Cir.
2018)).
403. Id. at 777.
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As the plaintiffs also alleged a breach of loyalty claims (not subject
to Dudenhoeffer), the Eighth Circuit turned to’ Twombly404 and Iqbal.405
Those cases set forth the proper pleading for breach of loyalty claims
which is to allege sufficient facts to bring about a plausible inference
that the defendants breached such duty.406 While there are numerous
Eighth Circuit cases that hold the duty of loyalty mandates that a fidu‐
ciary disclose material information about the company to the plan par‐
ticipants if such information could adversely impact the participants’
interests, such cases involve information about the plan, not about non‐
public information about the company or the company’s stock.407 In
fact, if such duty did require disclosure of nonpublic information about
the company or the company stock, it would circumvent the Dudenhoef‐
fer standard, rendering it null and void.408 The court also rejected the
appellants’ arguments that the defendants’ conflicts of interest or the
fact that they sold their shares of the company stock at inflated prices
were insufficient to create a plausible inference that they breached their
duty of loyalty.409
The Eighth Circuit reached a similar conclusion in Dormani v. Tar‐
get Corp.410 In Dormani, the participants of Target’s ESOP sued Target
and several of its senior executives alleging that they had breached their
ERISA fiduciary duties of prudence and loyalty, due to the losses suf‐
fered by the ESOP in the wake of Target’s expansion into Canada.411
From March 2013 to January 2015, Target suffered losses due to the
opening and closing of more than 100 Canadian stores.412 The losses
were reflected in the decline in Target’s common stock price, which in
404. See Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
405. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 555 U.S. 1030 (2008). The Twombly Court explain that
Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require that a complaint set forth facts
(in lieu of “labels” or “conclusions”) that give rise to a “plausible” (as opposed to a
“conceivable”) claim to relief, in order to withstand a motion to dismiss. Several
years later, the Court applied the Twombly holding to all civil suits, not just antitrust
or other complex cases.
406. Allen, 967 F.3d at 775.
407. Id. at 775–76.
408. Id. at 776–77 (citing In re Pilgrim’s Pride Stock Inv. Plan ERISA Litig., No.
08‐cv‐472, 2016 WL 8814356, at *4 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 19, 2016), (“Surely the [Supreme]
Court did not lay down the detailed requirements for pleading a breach of the duty
of prudence if all that was required was to label the insufficient allegations as a
breach of the duty of loyalty.”)).
409. Allen, 967 F.3d at 776–77.
410. See Dormani v. Target Corp., 970 F.3d 910 (8th Cir. 2020).
411. Id. at 913–14.
412. Id.
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turn hurt the participants of Target’s ESOP.413 The plan participants as‐
serted two alternative actions that the fiduciaries should have taken to
protect the plan against the decline in the value of the stock: public dis‐
closure of Target Canada’s challenges or a freeze in plan purchases of
the stock.414 The Eighth Circuit again rejected the public disclosure al‐
ternative action, arguing that it was “uncertain” as to whether it would
have diminished the harm.415 It viewed such argument as “allegation[s]
based on general economic principles. . . [that are] too generic to meet
the requisite pleading standard.”416 Thus, the Eighth Circuit held that a
reasonably prudent fiduciary could have believed disclosure “was the
more dangerous of the two routes.”417
The plan participants had also alleged that the fiduciaries violated
their ERISA duty of loyalty, which requires them “to deal fairly and
honestly with all plan members” and prohibits “affirmatively miscom‐
municat[ing] or mislead[ing] plan participants about material matters
regarding their ERISA plan when discussing a plan.”418 According to
the plan participants, ERISA’s duty of loyalty required the fiduciaries
to hire independent fiduciaries rather than “put themselves in a con‐
flicted position by having the [Plan] hold as much Target Stock as pos‐
sible to entrench management and provide other benefits to [Target]”
and “plac[e] their own and/or [Target’s] interests above the interests of
the participants.”419 The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s
holding that the participants failed to allege that the plan fiduciaries
knew they were making misleading or false statement and to specify
what statements were false.420 But even if they had, the court held that
the plaintiffs could not use ERISA’s duty of loyalty “to circumvent the
demanding Dudenhoeffer standard for duty of prudence claims.”421
413. Id. at 914.
414. Id. at 915.
415. Id.
416. Id. at 915 (quoting from Allen v. Wells Fargo & Co., No. 18‐2781, slip op. at
9‐10 (8th Cir. July 24, 2020)).
417. Dormani v. Target Corp., 970 F.3d 910, 915 (8th Cir. 2020) (citing other cir‐
cuits that have rejected this type of argument: Allen, slip op. at 10; Laffen v. Hewlett‐
Packard Co., 721 F. App’x 642, 644 (9th Cir. 2018) (per curiam); Saumer v. Cliffs Nat.
Res. Inc., 853 F.3d 855, 864 (6th Cir. 2017); Whitley v. BP, P.L.C., 838 F.3d 523, 529
(5th Cir. 2016)).
418. Dormani, 970 F.3d at 916 (quoting Kalda v. Sioux Valley Physician Partners,
Inc., 481 F.3d 639, 644 (8th Cir. 2007)).
419. Dormani, 970 F.3d at 916.
420. Id. at 917.
421. Id. (quoting Allen, slip op. at 13).
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District Court of New Jersey analysis post‐Jander

Similarly, in Perrone v. Johnson & Johnson, Perrone initiated a class
action breach of fiduciary duty suit on behalf of himself and the plan
participants of the Johnson & Johnson ESOP against the pharmaceutical
titan and its ESOP’s fiduciaries, who consisted of Johnson & Johnson
senior management.422 The plaintiffs alleged that the plan’s fiduciaries
knew for decades that Johnson & Johnson’s talc products contained as‐
bestos, a known carcinogen, but hid such information until it was dis‐
closed in 2018 in a Reuters article.423 Following the damning Reuters
article, Johnson & Johnson’s stock price dropped more than ten per‐
cent.424 The plaintiffs alleged that the plan fiduciaries failed to make any
corrective disclosures of this negative information, even after it became
inevitable that the information would become public.425 They argued
such corrective disclosure prior to the publication of the Reuters article
was an alternative action that the defendants could have taken, con‐
sistent with the securities laws, and one in which no prudent fiduciary
could have viewed more likely to harm the plan than to help it.426
The district court held that the plaintiffs failed to allege an alter‐
nate action in support of the fiduciary breach as such action would have
required the individual defendants to act solely in their corporate ca‐
pacity, and not in their fiduciary capacity.427 And even if the plaintiffs
had alleged an appropriate alternation action, they failed to show such
course of conduct would not “do more harm than good,” as they did
not allege “any particularized facts” to support the assertion that earlier
disclosure would have minimized the drop in the stock price.428 The
court noted that other courts have rejected generalized allegations (i.e.,
that the longer the concealment occurred, the greater harm to the plan)
that did not satisfy the Dudenhoeffer standard.429 Thus, the court granted
the defendant’s motion to dismiss.430
422. Perrone v. Johnson & Johnson, No. 19‐00923, 2020 WL 2060324, at *5 (D.N.J.
Apr. 29, 2020).
423. Id. at *2.
424. Id. at *3.
425. Id. at *4.
426. Id. at *4–11.
427. Id. at *14–17.
428. Id. at *19.
429. Id. (citing In re Allergan ERISA Litig., No. 17‐1554, 2018 WL 8415676, at *5
(D.N.J. July 2, 2018); In re JPMorgan Chase & Co. ERISA Litig., No. 12 Civ. 04027,
2016 WL 110521, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 8, 2016)).
430. Perrone v. Johnson & Johnson, No. 19‐00923, 2020 WL 2060324, at *19
(D.N.J. Apr. 29, 2020).
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The plaintiffs later filed an amended complaint but, again, John‐
son & Johnson’s motion to dismiss was granted.431 In the amended com‐
plaint, the plaintiffs made two allegations—first, under the “corrective
disclosure” theory, which would have required the defendants to make
corrective disclosure of the asbestos to the public to avoid subsequent
losses to the value of the company stock and second, under “cash
buffer” theory, which would have required the defendants to hold in‐
coming ESOP assets in cash until the value of the stock was no longer
artificially inflated.432 Under the corrective disclosure theory, the plain‐
tiffs argued that the ERISA fiduciaries do have a duty to disclose non‐
public information about the plan sponsor, even if such information
was obtained in the fiduciary’s capacity as a corporate executive be‐
cause the fiduciaries incorporated the company’s securities filing into
plan‐related documents.433 The court rejected such argument, stating
that Dudenhoeffer’s alternative action standard cannot force individual
defendants to act in their corporate capacity in order to satisfy their fi‐
duciary duties under ERISA.434 In the view of the court, the “crux” of
the plaintiff’s alternative action remained the same—the defendants
should have made corrective disclosure in the regular course of its se‐
curities filings and that making such corrective disclosure, once it be‐
came inevitable that the public would learn the truth, was the alterna‐
tive action they should have taken, consistent with securities laws, and
which no prudent fiduciary could have opined as more likely to harm
the plan than to help it.435
The plaintiffs relied on two cases: In re Schering‐Plough Corp.
ERISA Litig.,436 and Jander I.437 In Schering‐Plough, the issue was whether
ERISA fiduciaries could be held liable for misstatements in certain SEC
filings.438 Schering‐Plough, however, was clearly factually distinguisha‐
ble from those in Perrone. In Schering‐Plough, the court held that misrep‐
resentations in SEC securities filings could be actionable under ERISA
431. Perrone v. Johnson & Johnson, No. 19‐00923, 2021 WL 753887, at *13 (D.N.J.
Feb. 26, 2021).
432. Id. at *2.
433. Id. at *4.
434. Id. at *5.
435. Id.
436. Id. at *6; see In re Schering‐Plough Corp. ERISA Litig., No. Civ. A. 03‐1204,
2007 WL 2374989, at *1 (D.N.J. Aug. 15, 2007).
437. See Jander v. Ret. Plans Comm. of IBM, 910 F.3d 620 (2d Cir. 2018), vacated
and remanded, 140 S. Ct. 592 (2020).
438. In re Schering‐Plough, 2007 WL 2374989, at *6.
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if the plan‐related documents (e.g., summary plan description (“SPD”))
incorporated them by reference.439 Unlike that Schering‐Plough, Perrone
involved plan documents where the SEC filings were not incorporated
by reference; the plan’s summary plan description stated that copies of
the plan’s prospectus and other SEC filings are available to plan partic‐
ipants.440 The SEC filings are incorporated by reference only in the pro‐
spectus, not the SPD, and the prospectus is not a document which
ERISA requires to be disseminated to participants.441 Thus, the SEC fil‐
ings at issue could not be deemed to be fiduciary communications.442
The district court then noted the plaintiff’s reliance on Jander I was
misplaced as Jander I never answered the question of whether the alter‐
nate course of action must be one that the plan fiduciaries could have
taken only in their fiduciary capacity and not their corporate capacity.443
Hence, it reaffirmed its prior decision that a corrective SEC disclosure
uncovering the truth about the overvalued company stock is not a via‐
ble alternative action because it is not one that the fiduciary could take
in his/her fiduciary capacity.444
As to the cash buffer theory argument, the court held that pursu‐
ing such a course of action would have triggered disclosure under both
ERISA and the federal securities laws.445 As a result, a prudent fiduciary
could have concluded that such disclosure would result in decline in
the stock price and therefore, would have done “more harm than
good.”446 Thus, the court finds such argument unpersuasive.447 The dis‐
trict court again granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss.
C.

Ninth Circuit analysis post‐Jander

In Wilson v. Craver, the plaintiff, Cassandra Wilson, brought a
class action against the executives of Edison International Inc. (“Edi‐
son”) who were fiduciaries of Edison’s ESOP for retaining Edison stock,
even after they knew that the stock was artificially inflated.448 The plain‐
tiff asserted that the defendants knew that Edison stock price was
439.
440.
441.
442.
443.
444.
445.
446.
447.
448.

Id. at *6–7.
Id. at *7.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at *8.
Id. at *9–10.
Id. at *10.
Id.
Wilson v. Carter, 994 F.3d 1085, 1087 (9th Cir. 2021).
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artificially inflated due to its failure to disclose to the public misrepre‐
sentations Edison had made to public regulators regarding closure of a
power plant.449 When the misrepresentations were later disclosed, the
stock price declined fifteen percent.450 The district court dismissed the
complaint on the grounds that it failed to satisfy the Dudenhoeffer plead‐
ing standard.451
In applying the Dudenhoeffer “more harm than good” standard,
the Ninth Circuit affirmed the dismissal as the plaintiff had relied upon
“wholly conclusory allegations,” as opposed to “context‐specific alle‐
gations,” as to why a prudent fiduciary could not have concluded that
a corrective disclosure would do more harm than good to the stock
fund.452 The court noted that its sister circuits have all rejected the idea
that general economic principles are sufficient in explaining why an
earlier disclosure was “so clearly beneficial that a prudent fiduciary
could not conclude that it would be more likely to harm the fund than
help it.”453 Such general economic principles assert that the longer a
fraud is concealed, the greater harm to the company’s reputation and
its stock price.454
The court also distinguished the facts of this case from the Jander
decision as the facts at issue were “devoid of the ‘particularly im‐
portant’ allegations” that were set forth in Jander.455 The court con‐
cluded that even if the defendants had disclosed the misrepresentations
once they became “inevitable,” it was likely that it would have been
“too late” to benefit the plan participants by alleviating the correc‐
tion.456 The court surmised that it was unlikely “that a corrective disclo‐
sure was so clearly beneficial at the time that a prudent fiduciary in
Defendants’ positions could not have concluded that it would be more
likely to harm the fund than to help it.”457 Thus, the court rejected the

449. Id. at 1088.
450. Id. at 1089.
451. Wilson v. Edison Intl., Inc., 315 F. Supp. 3d 1177, 1194 (C.D. Cal. 2018), aff’d
sub nom., Wilson v, Craver, 994 F.3d 1085 (9th Cir. 2021).
452. Id. at 1092.
453. Id. at 1093 (citing Allen v. Wells Fargo & Co., 967 F.3d 767, 774 (8th Cir.
2020), cert. filed, denied, 141 S. Ct. 2594 (2021), No. 20‐866 (U.S. Dec. 30, 2020); Martone
v. Robb, 902 F.3d 519, 526‐27 (5th Cir. 2018); Graham v. Fearon, 721 F. App’x 429,
436–37 (6th Cir. 2018); Loeza v. John Does 1‐10, 659 F. App’x 44, 45–46 (2d Cir. 2016)).
454. Id. at 1093.
455. Id. at 1094.
456. Id. at 1095.
457. Id.
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proposed alternative action which involved early public disclosure as
it failed to meet the “more harm than good” test of Dudenhoeffer.458
D.

Second Circuit analysis post‐Jander

In the aftermath of the Jander decision, the Second Circuit (before
a different 3‐person panel of judges than in the Jander decision) was
faced with a similar ERISA prudence complaint in the case of Varga v.
General Electric Company.459 Plaintiff Varga brought a putative class ac‐
tion against General Electric (“GE”) and then‐CEO Jeffrey Robert Im‐
melt, alleging that they violated their ERISA fiduciary duties of pru‐
dence and loyalty by continuing to offer GE Stock Fund as an
investment option in GE’s 401(k) plan.460 According to the plaintiffs, GE
announced in 2018 that it had under reserved for the insurance liabili‐
ties of two of its subsidiaries by approximately $15 billion, causing the
GE common stock price to drop.461 Varga alleged that the defendants
knew of the problem since 2009, but delayed the “inevitable” disclosure
until 2018, when it would have to eventually pay the policyholder
claims as they became due.462 By not correcting their earlier false and
misleading statements to plan participants regarding the financial
health of GE’s subsidiaries, Varga alleged that the defendants breached
their ERISA fiduciary duties of prudence and loyalty.463 Varga alleged
two alternative actions that the defendants could have taken—disclose
the problem earlier or close the GE Stock Fund under the 401(k) plan to
additional investments after 2010.464
As to the first alternative action that a prudent fiduciary could not
have concluded that earlier disclosure would do more harm than good,
the district court held that there was no showing that earlier disclosure
was legally viable or that the defendants concluded that it would do
458. Id.
459. See Varga v. Gen. Elec. Co., 834 F. App’x 686 (2d Cir. 2021). The panel of
Second Circuit judges that presided over the Varga decision were Circuit Judges
Kearse, Pooler, and Lynch.
460. Varga v. Gen. Elec. Co., No. 1:18‐cv‐1449, 2020 WL 1064809, at *1 (N.D.N.Y.
Mar. 5, 2020). The allegations in the Varga complaint are similar to those alleged in
a 2006 putative class action brought by the participant of the GE Stock Fund, within
the GE 401(k) plan, in Cavalieri v. General Electric Co., No. 06cv315, 2009 WL 2426001
(N.D.N.Y. Aug. 6, 2009). That lawsuit settled in 2009.
461. Varga, 2020 WL 1064809, at *1.
462. Id. at *2.
463. Id.
464. Id. at *3.
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more harm than good.465 The court distinguishes the facts in this case
with Jander, where the fact that the defendant company (IBM) was go‐
ing to be sold was a “particularly important” assertion, because “a po‐
tential purchaser’s due diligence would likely result in discovery of the
business’s problems,” and thus, disclosure of the company’s overeval‐
uation was inevitable.466 In contrast, Varga failed to assert a similar
“major triggering event” that would have made GE’s disclosure inevi‐
table.467 As to the second alternative action that the defendants could
have closed the GE stock fund to additional investment after 2009, such
allegation is:
“speculation—not a factual allegation” such that a prudent fiduci‐
ary could have concluded that such alternative would do more
harm than good.468 Thus, the district court granted the defendants’
motion to dismiss as the plaintiff’s complaint failed to meet the
Dudenhoeffer pleading standard, as the alternative actions were in‐
adequate to show that the fiduciaries “could not have concluded. . .
would do more harm than good.”469

On appeal to the Second Circuit, Varga argued that the two alter‐
native actions that the defendants could have taken satisfied Jander, and
thus, her complaint should have survived a motion to dismiss.470 As to
Varga’s claim that disclosure was inevitable, the court held that Varga
failed to allege “any similar major triggering event” to the impending
sale in Jander that would have made GE’s disclosure inevitable; instead,
Varga merely alleges “that since other insurers with under‐funded
long‐term care liabilities ‘inevitably’ had to disclose their problems, GE
would have to as well.”471
Similarly, as to Varga’s second alternative action that the fiduci‐
aries could have closed the fund in 2009, such action is “similarly con‐
clusory, unsupported by an factual matter suggesting that the fiduciar‐
ies could not have concluded that such an action would do more harm

465. Id. at *4 (citing In re JPMorgan Chase & Co. ERISA Litig., No. 12 Civ. 04027,
2016 WL 110521, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 8, 2016), which rejected the earlier disclosure
argument on the basis that the longer the fraud continues, the more harm continues
because “[t]hese assertions are not particular to the facts of this case and could be
made by plaintiffs in any case asserting a breach of ERISA’s duty of prudence”).
466. Varga, 2020 WL 1064809 at *5, n.3 (citing from Jander v. Ret. Plans Comm.
of IBM, 910 F.3d 620, 630 (2d Cir. 2018)).
467. Varga, 2020 WL 1064809, at *5.
468. Id. at *4.
469. Id. at *3–4.
470. Varga v. Gen. Elec. Co., 834 F. App’x 686, 688 (2d Cir. 2021).
471. Id. (quoting from Varga, 2020 WL 1064809, at *4 n.3).
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than good.”472 Thus, the Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s dis‐
missal of Varga’s claim, signaling that the “inevitable theory” has its
shortcomings, even in the Second Circuit.473 The decision indicates that
the facts in the case, not the Dudenhoeffer standard, made it distinguish‐
able from the Jander decision.474 This, however, provides little guidance
to ESOP fiduciaries as to how to avoid future litigation, other than doc‐
umenting the lack of any “major triggering events” that would have
made disclosure inevitable.
In summary, with respect to Dudenhoeffer’s standard that the
breach of fiduciary claim was based on publicly available information
(i.e., the public‐disclosure argument), the federal courts have yet to
enunciate what amounts to “special circumstances,” making it difficult
for plaintiffs to survive a motion to dismiss on this claim. With respect
to the Dudenhoeffer’s second standard to allege a breach of fiduciary
claim on the basis of inside information (i.e., the plaintiffs must allege
an alternative action the defendant could have taken, consistent with
securities laws, and would not have been viewed by the defendant to
cause more harm to the fund than good), the circuits have rejected the
plaintiff’s arguments that public disclosure of negative information is a
viable alternative action as a prudent fiduciary could have concluded
that disclosure would do more harm than good “by causing a drop in
the stock price and a concomitant drop in the value of the stock already
held be the fund.”475 Such allegations are based on general economic
principles that “the longer the fraud persists, the harsher the correction
tends to be, usually because a prolonged fraud necessarily means that
long‐term damage is also done to a fraudster’s reputation for trustwor‐
thiness.”476 Only a panel of three judges in the Second Circuit has con‐
cluded that a prudent fiduciary would have made earlier disclosure, as
compared to later disclosure, when the drop in the stock price held by
the fund is inevitable, so as to limit the effect on the stock price.477 The
472. Varga, 834 F. App’x at 688.
473. Id. at 689.
474. Id. at 688.
475. Singh v. RadioShack Corp., 882 F.3d 137, 149 (5th Cir. 2018) (per curiam)
(quoting Dudenhoeffer, 573 U.S. at 430). See, e.g., Saumer v. Cliffs Natural Res. Inc.,
853 F.3d 855, 864 (6th Cir. 2017); Whitley v. BP, P.L.C., 838 F.3d 523, 529 (5th Cir.
2016) (holding “that a prudent fiduciary could very easily conclude that [disclosure
of such information] would do more harm than good”); Allen v. Wells Fargo & Co.,
967 F.3d 767, 773 (8th Cir. 2020).
476. Martone v. Robb, 902 F.3d 519, 526‐27 (5th Cir. 2018).
477. Jander v. Ret. Plans Comm. of IBM, 910 F.3d 620, 630 (2d Cir. 2018).
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other circuits have rejected this argument that allegations of inevitable
disclosure and increasing harm over time, as they fail the “no more
harm than good” test.478 In response, plaintiffs have attempted to allege
that the defendant’s correction disclosure should have been made in
the course of the regular securities filings with the SEC (e.g., annual or
quarterly reports).479 They have also attempted to buttress their allega‐
tions with expert reports or testimony at the pleading stage.480 But such
efforts have not succeeded.481 Thus, the Dudenhoeffer dual standards ap‐
pear to be formidable for the plaintiff’s bar to prevail. While there was
a glimmer of hope that the Supreme Court would clarify whether the
Jander inevitable theory could withstand a motion to dismiss, it left that
question open for another day. In the meantime, the majority of the fed‐
eral circuit courts continue to be defendant friendly in dismissing stock
drop litigation.

IX. How do employers and ESOP fiduciaries avoid
future litigation
It is clear from the Dudenhoeffer pleading standard that the Su‐
preme Court does not wish to weigh‐in on plan governance issues, in‐
cluding how and when an ESOP fiduciary should buy and sell em‐
ployer stock in a volatile financial market.482 Dudenhoeffer considers
claims based on public information (thereby requiring “special circum‐
stances” to be alleged in order to overcome this standard) or claims
based on nonpublic information (thereby requiring an alternative ac‐
tion to be alleged, consistent with securities law, whereby a prudent
fiduciary could not have concluded that such action would do more
harm than good).483 The Jander “inevitable disclosure” theory, caveating
the second nonpublic claim appears to be an outlier in most circuits,
including a panel of judges within the Second Circuit.484
478. See, e.g., Dormani v. Target Corp., 970 F.3d 910, 916 (8th Cir. 2020); Allen v.
Wells Fargo & Co., 967 F.3d 767, 773 (8th Cir. 2020); Perrone v. Johnson & Johnson,
No. 19‐00923, 2020 WL 2060324, at *11 (D.N.J. Apr. 29, 2020); Varga v. General Elec‐
tric Co., 834 Fed. Appx 686, 688 (N.D.N.Y. 2021).
479. Perrone v. Johnson & Johnson, No. 19‐00923, 2020 WL 2060324, at *11
(D.N.J. Apr. 29, 2020).
480. In re BP P.L.C. Securities Litigation, 2017 WL 914995 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 8, 2017).
481. See, e.g., Burke v. Boeing Co., 2020 WL 6681338, at *4–5 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 12,
2020).
482. See Fifth Third Bancorp v. Dudenhoeffer, 573 U.S. 409, 428–30 (2014).
483. Id.
484. See, e.g., Wilson v. Craver, 994 F.3d 1085, 1094–96 (9th Cir. 2021).
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While none of the lower courts have thus far outlined the “special
circumstances” necessary for purposes of successfully pleading a
breach of fiduciary claim of prudence based on public information, the
plaintiffs’ bar will become more skillful in crafting such circumstances,
so as to survive a motion to dismiss. The standard, however, to assert a
breach of fiduciary claim of prudence based on nonpublic information
appears to be an impossible standard for the plaintiffs’ bar to meet. As
made clear by the Eighth Circuit in Braden—which did not involve
stock drop litigation, but a similar breach of fiduciary claim for exces‐
sive fees—ERISA plaintiffs tend to simply lack “the inside information
necessary to make out their claims in detail unless and until discovery
commence.”485 This remains true in stock drop litigation in which the
ESOP fiduciary may be privy to inside information. Thus, fashioning
alternative actions the ESOP fiduciary should have taken, consistent
with securities law, may be an impossible task as the plaintiffs are not
privy to the actions that a fiduciary could have taken advantage of and
still not inflict more harm than good on the plan participants. As a re‐
sult, stock drop litigation continues to be extremely defendant friendly,
despite the lasting effects of drop in stock price for participants and
beneficiaries, who are often dependent on the health of the stock for
retirement.486 Given the more pressing problems facing the current
Congress, it is highly unlikely that it will take on the challenge and im‐
pose more protections for plan participants and beneficiaries in stock
drop litigation.487
Another litigation issue that plaintiff may consider in stock drop
litigation is ERISA’s venue provisions. It provides a liberal venue pro‐
vision in the context of breaches of fiduciary duty, allowing lawsuits to
be brought in any venue “in the district where the plan is administered,
where the break took place, or where a defendant resides or may be
found.”488 Hence, defendants should not be surprised to see plaintiffs
bringing ERISA lawsuits in the courts within the Second Circuit (which
include the states of Connecticut, New York, and Vermont) where the
inevitable theory has gained traction. Thus, if a defendant can be
485. Braden v. Wal‐Mart Stores, Inc., 588 F.3d 585, 598 (8th Cir. 2009).
486. See, e.g., Joseph P. Yonadi Jr., ESOPs, Stock‐Drop Litigation and Jander, OHIO
STATE BAR ASS’N (July 20, 2020), https://www.ohiobar.org/member‐tools‐bene‐
fits/practice‐resources/practice‐library‐search/practice‐library/section‐newsletters/
2020/esopss‐stock‐drop‐litigation‐jander/ (describing the Jander plaintiffs’ victory as
a “Rare Stock‐Drop Win for ERISA Plaintiff Attorneys”).
487. But see S. 1559, 117th Cong. (2021).
488. 29. U.S.C. § 1132(e)(2).
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“found” in New York, the plaintiff is likely to bring suit within the fed‐
eral courts in New York in order to apply the Second Circuit’s more
plaintiff‐friendly interpretation of the more‐harm‐than‐good standard.
Regardless of congressional appetite for action, there are practical
steps that ESOP or 401(k) ESOP plan creators should take in order to
avoid stock‐drop litigation. ESOP fiduciaries should recall the early
DOL Information Letters that stressed strict procedural prudence when
such fiduciaries decide to purchase employer stock and to finance the
ESOP loan.489 The ESOP fiduciaries should properly document its deci‐
sion‐making process in procuring employer stock and its monitoring to
continue to hold on to employer stock, including a lack of “special cir‐
cumstances” needed for one of the two Dudenhoeffer standards. While
the use of independent financial and legal counsel is advised, the ulti‐
mate responsibility for the decisions regarding the ESOP lie with its fi‐
duciary.490 Thus, as an overarching consideration, employers sponsor‐
ing ESOPs or 401(k) ESOP plans should always focus on developing
effective and thorough plan governance protocols.491 The courts deter‐
mine whether a fiduciary has breached his or her duty of prudence
based on the process by which he or she made his or her decisions, not
the actual results of such decisions.492 With respect to the plan’s invest‐
ment strategy, the first issue is to determine who will sit on the plan’s
investment committee, as those individuals will be deciding whether to
hold or sell employer stock in the event of a market decline. If the em‐
ployer wishes to maintain total control in choosing the plan investment
committee, it should avoid putting officers or executives, inside legal
counsel, or any other board member or individual who may be privy to
nonpublic information. Therefore, choosing personnel one level below
the executive‐level managers may be the answer, so long as the chosen
individuals do not effectively become “stand‐ins” for their superiors.
Another issue for ESOP plan creators is whether to insert or retain
language in the plan document requiring the fiduciary to hold
489. See DOL Information Letters to Gareth W. Cook (Sept. 12, 1983) (on file with
author); DOL Information Letters to Charles R. Smith (Nov. 23, 1984) (reprinted in
12 PENS. & BENS. REP. 52); DOL Information Letters to Wilson H. Ellis, Jr. (July 30,
1985), (reprinted in 12 PENS. & BENS. REP. 52).
490. See 29 C.F.R. § 2550.404a‐1 (2020).
491. See generally Corporate Governance For Private ESOP Companies, EMPLOYEE
BENEFITS LAW GROUP (Feb. 8, 2017), https://www.employeebenefitslawgroup.com/
corporate‐governance‐for‐private‐esop‐companies‐full‐article/.
492. See Roth v. Sawyer‐Cleator Lumber Co., 16 F.3d 915, 917–18 (8th Cir. 1994);
Schaefer v. Ark. Med. Soc’y, 853 F.2d 1487, 1492 (8th Cir. 1988).
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employer stock.493 ERISA requires a plan fiduciary to follow the terms
of the plan, but only to the extent such terms are consistent with
ERISA.494 The Supreme Court in Dudenhoeffer was clear that ERISA’s
duty of prudence “trumps the instructions of a plan document, such as
an instruction to invest exclusively in company stock.”495 Having the
plan document explicitly require the plan fiduciary to hold employer
stock within the ESOP buttresses the fiduciary’s argument that it is fol‐
lowing the terms of the plan, consistent with ERISA’s prudence require‐
ments.496
Another issue for consideration is how the plan fiduciaries will
monitor the retention of employer stock within the ESOP. The goal is to
determine what “special circumstances” that the Dudenhoeffer Court al‐
luded to that would trigger reliance on the market’s price of the em‐
ployer stock as being unreliable.497 Some examples of what could trig‐
ger “special circumstances” include: a rating agency’s (e.g., Moody’s or
S&P) warning regarding the employer’s credit worthiness; a special
pronouncement from the SEC or the plan auditor reflecting upon the
financial health of the employer; and the employer’s auditor issuing
something other than an unqualified opinion.498 Whatever the “special
circumstances” the employer chooses to focus on, well‐documented fi‐
duciary meeting minutes and other corporate records should reflect the
fiduciary’s deliberation on the issue of retaining or selling employer
stock in the event of the stock price dropping.
Additionally, an ESOP fiduciary should consider invoking a com‐
pany stock monitoring policy, which may or may not be a part of the
plan’s investment policy statement (“IPS”). Such a monitoring policy
would not be designed to unduly limit the ESOP fiduciary’s actions,
but instead highlight those special circumstances that may require a
heightened level of review of the company’s stock. As such, the moni‐
toring policy should provide flexibility for the fiduciary to exercise
his/her discretion in light of pre‐specified review‐triggering events.
While ERISA allows an ESOP fiduciary to wear two hats—one of
fiduciary and another of corporate settlor—the use of an independent
493. See, e.g., Yonadi Jr., supra note 486 (noting that “[a]n ESOP fiduciary may
utilize the ESOP plan document as a shield if such document incorporates language
requiring employer contributions to be invested in employer stock.”).
494. 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(D) (2019).
495. See Fifth Third Bancorp v. Dudenhoeffer, 573 U.S. 409, 421 (2014).
496. See generally Yonadi Jr., supra note 486.
497. Dudenhoeffer, 573 U.S. at 413.
498. See generally id. at 426.
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fiduciary for the ESOP may solve many of these problems. As the inde‐
pendent fiduciary would not be involved with other corporate duties,
he or she would wear only one hat—that of the fiduciary. This would
also address the stock‐monitoring issue by having the independent fi‐
duciary in charge of all aspects of the ESOP. The appointment can take
on many shapes and forms—an independent fiduciary many have lim‐
ited scope (e.g., he or she simply serves as an advisor to the fiduciary
committee) or broader scope (e.g., full discretionary power including
decisions surrounding the sale/purchase of employer stock). The de‐
gree of authority the independent fiduciary would have may depend
on factors such as the volatility of the employer stock within its indus‐
try and market.
The advantages of an independent fiduciary with full discretion‐
ary powers include:








The company would be exposed to less risk of stock‐drop liti‐
gation, especially if the claim is based on inside knowledge, as
the independent fiduciary is wearing only one hat—that of the
fiduciary—and is not privy to any nonpublic information.
The company would have less oversight responsibility in
monitoring the company stock as the independent fiduciary
would ideally be given that authority. Of course, the employer
would still be responsible for monitoring its appointed inde‐
pendent fiduciary.
Corporate executives, who otherwise would have been named
as plan fiduciary, would be less distracted, especially at a time
that involves corporate emergencies that traditionally give rise
to stock drop litigation.
Hiring independent plan fiduciaries acts as an insurance pol‐
icy in the event of a corporate emergency impacting the com‐
pany stock. Although hiring an independent fiduciary may be
expensive, in the event the company needs the protection af‐
forded by an independent fiduciary in the face of negative or
sudden corporate event, it’s worth every penny.

The disadvantages of an independent fiduciary include:





The expense of the independent fiduciary’s fees.
The company has less control over the fiduciary’s action,
which could be problematic if the company is in a less volatile
industry.
There are additional administrative concerns (e.g., the inde‐
pendent fiduciary must participate in the minutes).
In the event the company wishes to terminate its independent
fiduciary’s contract, the company will have to do so carefully
so that it does not appear that the company is in search of a
more pliant independent fiduciary.
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What is the future of ESOP plans? They are definitely not going
away, especially in the context of the S‐Corporations, where ESOPs
have become entrenched.499 The late Senator Ted Kennedy proposed
legislation to permit ESOPs, but only, if they were supplemental on top
of a base 401(k) plan, sponsored by the employer, so that the ESOP was
not the sole form of retirement income for the participant.500 That legis‐
lation went nowhere, and there is little appetite in the current Congress
to alter ERISA’s rules as they pertain to ESOPs.501
Shareholders of publicly traded corporations receive voting rights
when they purchase their stock, affording them the right to voice their
concerns on corporate matters. According to one study, institutional in‐
vestors—such as mutual funds, index funds, pensions, and hedge
funds—own seventy percent of the outstanding shares of publicly
traded corporations in the United States, thereby granting them a major
influence in voting outcomes.502 There are a variety of proxy advisory
firms that make recommendations to institutional investors as to how
they should vote their shares in order to effectuate corporate change
and outcomes.503 It remains to be seen whether proxy advisors such as
Glass Lewis & Co. and/or ISS will add to their list of “best practices,”
the use of independent fiduciaries within an ESOP as a way to stem
future litigation and to provide greater protection for plan participants
and beneficiaries. If that becomes the case, it won’t be the first‐time
499. According to the National Center for Employee Ownership in Oakland,
CA, as of 2018, there are 6,501 ESOPs in the United States (of which 90% are with
privately held companies), holding total assets of over $1.4 trillion and covering
over 14 million participants. There are also over 4,000 qualified retirement plans that
are “ESOP‐like” in that they are substantially (at least 20%) invested in employer
stock and have at least 5 participants. C Corporations are subject to federal income
taxes both at the corporate level and shareholder level. In contrast, S Corporations
do not pay taxes at the corporate level, as their shareholders are subject to taxation
based on their prop rata share of the S Corporation’s taxable income. An ESOP is a
tax‐exempt trust and thus is not subject to federal income tax on its share of the S
Corporation’s taxable income. Hence, if an S Corporation is owned 100% by an
ESOP, it will owe no taxes on its otherwise taxable income. See The ESOP Associa‐
tion, ESOP Brief #3, Tax Advantages for Business Planning, ESOP, https://esopassocia‐
tion.org/sites/tea‐master/files/2019‐12/esop‐brief‐3‐final.pdf.
500. See generally S. Rep. No. 107‐226 (2002).
501. But see S. 1559, 117th Cong. (2021).
502. 2020 Proxy Season Review, ProxyPulse (2020), available at https://proxy‐
pulse.broadridge.com.
503. See David F. Larcker, “The Big Thumb on the Scale: An Overview of the
Proxy Advisory Industry,” Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance,
available at https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2018/06/14/the‐big‐thumb‐on‐the‐
scale‐an‐overview‐of‐the‐proxy‐advisory‐industry.
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federal securities law principles come to the aid of ERISA plan partici‐
pants and beneficiaries.504

X. Conclusion
Stock drop litigation has generated a considerable amount of liti‐
gation since ERISA’s passage. It highlights the tension in ERISA with
promoting ESOPs which can invest primarily in employer stock with
its duty of prudence in the context of employer stock falling in value.
While the majority of circuits affirmed the Third Circuit’s Moench pre‐
sumption which extended a presumption that an ESOP fiduciary had
not breached its fiduciary duty of prudence from 1995 until 2014, the
Supreme Court in the Dudenhoeffer decision imposed a new two‐part
pleading standard in order for the plaintiffs to withstand a motion to
dismiss: (1) if the breach of fiduciary claim was based on publicly avail‐
able information, the plaintiffs must allege “special circumstances” (a
term undefined by the Court) as to why the market price was unreliable
or (2) if the breach of fiduciary claim was based on nonpublic inside
information, the plaintiffs must allege that the fiduciary should have
taken an alternative course of action, consistent with securities law, af‐
ter it concluded that such alternative action would not have done more
harm than good to the plan’s funds. These standards have proven far
more rigorous that the pleading standard required in a garden‐variety
breach of fiduciary duty claim, as seen in litigation involving the un‐
derperformance of investment funds offered by the fiduciary to the
plan participants and/or the reasonableness of the fees assess by such
504. Former U.S. Secretary of Labor Thomas Perez wished to make changes in
the financial world regarding the standards of care that financial advisers were sub‐
ject to in their dealings with ERISA plans and IRAs. As a result, the DOL rolled out
in 2015 proposed regulations redefining who was an investment advice fiduciary
for purposes of Title I of ERISA and the Code’s prohibited transaction rules. These
were finalized in 2016 and subjected broker/dealers and their registered represent‐
atives to a new “best interest” standard, in lieu of the “suitability” standard appli‐
cable to them under securities law. The regulations also adopted from securities law
that that broker/dealers eliminate and mitigate all conflicts of interests. They
adopted securities laws’ notion that advising a plan participant on his/her ability to
roll monies into an IRA was an investment recommendation. The final regulations
were ultimately vacated by the Fifth Circuit Court. In the wake of the vacated regu‐
lation, the SEC issued Regulation BI (Release No. 34‐83062) which invoked a “best
interest” standard of care applicable to broker/dealers when making investment rec‐
ommendations. See Kathryn J. Kennedy, “The DOL Final Fiduciary Regulations and
Related Prohibited Transaction Exemptions,” 2016 NYU REV. EMPLOYEE BENEFITS &
EXEC. COMP. CH.‐2 (Fall 2016).
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investment funds. Since 2014, the Dudenhoeffer pleading standards, in
the context of stock drop litigation, have proven to be extremely de‐
fendant friendly. While the plaintiffs’ bar had a glimmer of hope with
the 2018 Jander decision out of the Second Circuit, the Supreme Court
in taking certiorari in the decision declined to rule on the merits of that
decision, leaving it to another day to rule on this issue. In the meantime,
the majority of circuits, including a three‐person panel in the Second
Circuit, have declined to invoke Jander’s inevitable disclosure theory,
thus, affirming the Dudenhoeffer standards as imposing an insurmount‐
able hurdle for the plaintiffs’ bar. There are, however, a host of ways
that an employer and/or ESOP fiduciaries can avoid future stock drop
litigation, including appointing an independent ESOP fiduciary.

